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Abstract
Today, the Norwegian energy sector is significantly dominated by public ownership, both directly 
and indirectly, and the sector has turned out to be very profitable compared to other sectors. 
This master thesis starts by introducing some concepts of corporate governance and the agency 
theory which will be the theoretical basis. 
The study attempts to determine the relationship between the level of fixed pay and profitability, 
and ownership structure and profitability of Norwegian hydroelectric energy companies. According 
to a tremendous amount of research conducted on these relationships in other industries and sectors, 
the level of compensation to the CEO, the number of owners and the size of the largest shareholder 
are explanatory factors to the profitability of each company. In this study, I will examine whether 
we can make the same generalization about the Norwegian energy industry, with regards to the 
extensive governmental and municipal ownership influence and the historical perspective regarding 
the monopolistic pre-1991 market conditions of these companies in Norway. 
The empirical data collection was based on all of the companies with total revenues exceeding 
NOK 100 millions, hence no regional or structural limitations. I have used regression analyses in 
order to carry out the research. 
Despite the vast amount of research on this field which indicates relations, I was not able to 
determine any relationship between the level of fixed pay or the number of owners and profitability 
in my population. However, I was able to indicate a weak positive relationship between owner 
concentration and profitability of  the industry. 
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 1 Introduction
 1.1 Background 
How is the level of managerial compensation of Norwegian hydroelectric energy companies 
affecting the profitability? And what impacts does the ownership structure have on the energy 
industry in Norway? Today, the sector is dominated by companies owned by the state or 
municipalities in the region which is directly affected by the power plant. In some of cases there are 
a large number of municipalities having equal shares in the companies, where each municipality is 
controlling a small part. In other companies, Statkraft or a single municipality may single-handedly 
control the entire company. This paper focuses on what the ownership structure and the level of 
managerial pay in Norwegian hydroelectric energy companies have to say on corporate governance 
and the profitability. The reason behind this topic is that the companies have a significantly high 
average rate of profitability compared to many other industries.
So, to begin, efficient corporate governance assumes a sufficient level of incentives and managerial 
pay (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). There are two criteria which need to be met in order to have 
efficient corporate governance according to Keasey, Thompson and Wright (2005), one at a micro 
level and the other at a macro level. 
At the micro level the company needs to establish a corporate governance system which leads the 
company as a whole onto the track toward its objectives. There are different requirements 
depending on where the company is situated around the world when it comes to this level. The 
differences are mainly regarding stakeholders, and how the stakeholders (i.e. employees, social 
communities, etc.) should be emphasized. The management needs in this case to not only focus on 
maximizing shareholder value, but stakeholder as well (Keasey, Thompson & Wright, 2005), (De 
Wit & Meyer, 2004). 
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The macro level implies establishing trust with investors and other potential investors. From a 
society's point of view there are many reasons why companies should be managed according to high 
standards. First of all, the companies are adding value in the society. Secondly, the companies may 
be the corner stone and the foundation of an entire society. In this case with energy companies in 
Norway, this is the case in several scarcely populated rural districts where important part of the 
income comes from a local power plant. 
During the last decades, Norway has positioned itself as an important exporter of hydroelectric 
power. In 1991 the conservative government lead by prime minister Syse liberalized the market 
conditions and opened up to free competition on the energy market, thus converging Norway's 
conditions to the ones of the European markets. The main difference between the European and 
Norwegian energy industry is the ownership structure and corporate governance, where the 
European is in a significantly larger degree privatized compared to the Norwegian competitors. In 
Norway on the other hand, it is normal to observe the state or a selection of local municipalities as 
the major stock owners in the companies. And when it comes to micro level as mentioned above 
and the stakeholder values in the Norwegian energy industry, emphasizing stakeholder values is not 
only recommended; a company applying for a licence to produce electricity is forced by law to 
include stakeholders, for instance the entire local society, in the planning process. This can be done 
by arranging a public meeting between interest parties in the society and company representatives 
or management (NVE). 
 1.2 Problem definition and hypothesis
I would like to study how the number and concentration of owners, private and public, means for 
the efficiency and profitability of Norwegian energy companies. I would also like to find out 
whether high public concentration of owners implies barriers when it comes to ambitions of 
expanding, being competitive and thus a lack of motivation to struggle towards higher costs 
efficiency. I assume that the most important focus for public owners is to support the community as 
a stakeholder, not necessarily maximizing shareholder value. Even though the elected 
representatives of the municipalities as shareholders of a company are forced to emphasize the 
social community, it can lead to conflicts as with the example of the small municipality of 
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Leikanger. Here, a development of a power plant which will yield increased annual dividends to the 
already penniless municipality does not have the support among the community since they fear the 
new power lines will ruin a highly appreciated and untouched natural area (Sogn Avis). 
There are many energy companies in Norway. The large degree of precipitation together with a 
mountainous landscape makes it possible to produce electricity from a large number of dammed up 
lakes, waterfalls and rivers varying in size. The objectives of this research will be the big and mid-
size companies. I will exclude micro plants since most of these do not compete in any market, and 
are being fully owned by either a larger nearby energy company or the group of receivers of the 
electricity from the power plant. Therefore the selection will be on the all of the companies with a 
total income exceeding NOK 100 million. What I would like to study is whether energy companies 
with a large number of minor owners will have lower profitability than companies with more a 
more concentrated ownership structure. 
Therefore, my problem definition is: 
Is there coherence between managerial pay, ownership structure, ownership concentration 
and profitability of Norwegian hydroelectric energy companies? 
Based on the information above and the following chapters regarding relevant theories, my 
hypotheses for corporate governance in the Norwegian hydroelectric energy companies are as 
follows:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): There is a positive relationship between the amount of fixed pay to the 
CEO and the profitability of the company.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): There is a positive relationship between ownership concentration and the 
profitability of the company. 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): There is a negative relationship between the number of owners and the 
profitability of the company.
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 1.3 Corporate governance system
According to Thomsen (2008) a governance system is a set of governance mechanisms in use in a 
given country or context. 
Figure 1.1: A schematic model of corporate governance (Thomsen, 2008).
As seen above, one of the governance mechanisms is having an incentive system for managerial 
compensation. As we will see, in the case of the Norwegian energy sector both culture, board 
structure, incentive systems differ from what is mainstream in publicly listed companies at for 
instance Oslo Børs. 
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 1.4 Incentive systems
Thomsen (2008) describes incentive systems as: […] the incentives given to managers. Managerial  
pay (compensation) consists of fixed salary, bonus, stock options, stock grants, and other benefits 
(i.e. health insurance, fringe benefits, and a pension scheme). According to Thomsen, incentive 
systems should give managers incentives to act in the interest of the shareholders. Both the well-
known agency problems of adverse selection and moral hazard can be reduced or avoided by 
implementing an efficient incentive system. 
Although Thomsen warns; incentive systems are not all good. If badly designed, they can lead to 
opportunism in the sense that managers exploit the system for their own benefit. After all, incentive 
systems implies large transactions of money from the shareholders to the managers. 
So how are the effects of  in Norwegian hydroelectric energy companies? Here it is assumed that 
the more incentives that are being used, the higher is the company's rate of profitability. As already 
mentioned, many of the Norwegian energy companies are owned by a few or many relatively equal 
partners, being municipalities or the state-owned Statkraft (directly or indirectly). Thomsen states 
that  the vast majority (99% of all companies) are owned by one or two shareholders who also 
manage the company. It is difficult to understand why. Owner-management aligns the interests of  
owners and managers. It is their own money, so they have the incentive to manage it well. In this 
case of the Norwegian hydroelectric energy industry, it is seldom like this, unless huge industrial 
corporations have their own power plant to supply electricity to their own factories. However, these 
cases are normally small, and do not have revenues over NOK 100 million, so they are excluded 
from this paper. 
As a critique, Thomsen also states: Large owners may also have idiosyncratic preferences, which 
do not maximize shareholder value. For example, they may prefer that the company is managed by 
a family member or they may want to retain ownership in the family despite an attractive offer from 
the outside which the minority shareholders would prefer. Can we see any similarities between 
Thomsen's example and a typical Norwegian energy company without one large owner but instead 
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several small municipal shareholders? Arguably yes, in the sense that all of the municipalities will 
have a common goal, similar structure, size and interests (e.g. stakeholder value), so it can be said 
that the bunch of minor municipal shareholder can in fact be regarded as an entity – one large 
shareholder. However, in the following parts of this paper the municipal shareholders will be 
regarded as single units with limited liability and interests. 
Thomsen finishes off with a statement which is highly relevant to this topic. He says that the effect 
of large owners depends on the owners identity. Is the owner a financial investor will the objective 
probably be pure shareholder value. On the other hand, if the identity is a government owner, then 
the objective will probably be somewhat different other then shareholder maximization. 
 1.5 Norwegian context
As mentioned above, a governance system is a set of governance mechanisms in use in a given 
country or context. The next parts focuses on the Norwegian context, which in many cases is quite 
different from other countries and industries. 
 1.5.1 History
According to NVE, the rivers and the waterfalls have been used for a very long time in Norway.  
Long before 1900 nearly all small villages and hamlets had a sawmill run by water power. […] 
Many of the companies involved in this industry were owned by non-Norwegians. The authorities  
were concerned that the water resources could fall into foreign hands and wanted to retain control.  
The licence laws were passed, prohibiting the purchase of waterfalls and storage of water in 
reservoirs for power plants without permission of the King. These laws were passed and  amended 
between 1906 and 1917. 
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Due to the massive destructions during world war two, Norway had to be rebuilt with new industry 
and new homes. As a result, the need for electricity in households and industry had increased 
rapidly. New technologies also increased the demand, thus dams were being constructed, tunnels 
were being built and expansion of power lines gave electricity to the periphery of Norway. 
Thus, the electricity market in Norway was traditionally made up by local monopolies, owned by 
either the state or one or more municipalities. Some private companies was dedicated to deliver 
electricity only to a certain industry. These companies was operating under the law of “hjemfall”, 
meaning that the ownership should be transferred back to the state after 60 years. The companies 
was in addition to this obligated to deliver to every consumer. The most interesting aspect about this 
is that the price was set politically, implying that the only factors setting the price was to: a) 
compensating for the production costs, b) incomes for investments and c) potential taxation to the 
municipality. 
In 1991 something happened that would change the industry. A new “energy law” open up to free 
competition and buying and selling of electricity. The law was put forward by the conservative 
Syse-government, and was supported by the Labour Party. Because of the new law, the energy 
companies was no longer tied only to their own region, and they were not forced to deliver to 
everyone within the area. In other words, electricity had now become a product that could be traded 
both domestic and abroad, and the price was set by the market. There was even an exchange set up 
where electricity could be traded. In 1998, the market was expanded to include Sweden, and later 
both Denmark and Finland joined. As time went by and a market was established, the public 
companies was transformed into joint stock companies, which paves the way for fully or partially 
privatization of the companies (NVE).
 1.5.2 Perspectives today
Since the European Union (EU) was formed in 1957, it's overall goal has been to remove borders 
and barriers of trade among the European countries, which include the energy industries. Even 
though Norway is not fully a member of the union, we are bounded to the European Economic 
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Agreement (EEA). In 2000, 56 % of hydro electric industry in Norway was owned by the 
municipalities and 31 % by the state. A conflict between Norway and ESA, which controls the EEA, 
has emerged because of the 13 % owned my private companies and the already mentioned law of 
“hjemfall”. In Norway, private ownership of energy companies has to be transferred back to the 
state after 60 years, which ESA states is a discrimination of private owners (DeFacto). 
Because of this law, Statkraft which is owned by the state will be able to take over these plants, and 
strengthen its position internationally, which will make it even mote attractive for private investors, 
hence The Norwegian Competition Authority does not allow Statkraft to grow any more in the 
Norwegian market (DeFacto). 
 1.5.3 Juridical basis
There are a few underlying causes to why the ownership structure of the Norwegian hydroelectric 
energy companies are as dominated by the state or the local authorities as they are today which are 
worth mentioning. These causes will later on contribute to providing explanations to the outcomes 
of the analyses. 
To be able to produce electricity in Norway companies need to apply for a licence. According to 
NVE, a license in this context is “a document which grants special permission to a specified 
company to develop and run power stations and dams specified in the license, including conditions 
and rules of operation.” 
Another definition also given by NVE is the following: “A licence can also be defined as  
permission granted by the authorities to cause damage to the environment. However, those 
damages should be less important compared to the advantages of the project. The damage should 
not be larger than necessary, and may be mitigated at acceptable costs.” 
The “environment” in this context does not only encompass damages like pollution (however it is 
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the main consideration), but also social conditions. In other words, stakeholder values as defined by 
Freeman and Reed (1983), where the wide sense of stakeholders includes any identifiable group or 
individual who can affect the achievement of an organization's objectives or who is affected by the 
achievements of an organization's objectives is being emphasized in a legal sense. Because of the 
increased focus on environmental issues during the 1960's, hydro plants applying for licenses was in 
1969 obliged to notify stakeholders via NVE and include them in the planning process. The reason 
was to avoid conflicts between stakeholders (NGO's, landowners, local communities or persons, 
etc.) and the shareholders of the company. Further, when a notification is sent from the developer to 
NVE, it is being forwarded to central and local authorities and the public for consultation. The local 
community gets the chance to study the plan at a post office, public library or town hall. Later, a 
meeting is being arranged where all stakeholders can comment on the plan and give information on 
special usage of the river or waterfall. From this paper's point of view, this is a very interesting 
matter indicating a judicial basis for the distribution of influence between shareholders and 
stakeholders, which will be discussed later on (NVE). An example of current interest is given where 
Sognekraft are planning to invest NOK 10 billions the next two years, where a large part of it is set 
aside for developing power lines through untouched nature in the municipality of Leikanger. Here, 
the elected representatives have raised objections against the plans, and have (per October 2009) 
able to stop the project (Sogn Avis). The influence of the these stakeholders, among others, mainly 
through ownership of such companies will be looked into later. 
 1.6 Structure of the assignment
This paper is divided into 5 chapters, each influenced by the research procedure presented by Lund 
and Haugen (2006). 
Chapter 1 – Introduction
In the first part I explain why I have chosen this topic, and how the structure is through out the 
assignment. The problem definition is presented, as well as the boundaries to the selection of 
objectives in this research.  I have briefly presented some background information which may 
enlighten the reader to why the industry is so heavily dominated by the state or local authorities as it 
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is today compared to other sectors. There is a section about the terms of corporate governance, 
ownership structure and incentives which is the focus of this paper. 
Chapter 2 – Theory
In order to provide an answer to the problem of this paper, a theoretical foundation is needed. The 
theoretical part is based on Agency theory, which is considered to be relevant since I will in this 
paper look for coherence between incentives, ownership structure and profitability of Norwegian 
hydroelectric energy companies. 
Chapter 3 – Methodology
Here is where I do thoroughly into the research process based on relevant theory about 
methodology, and a presentation of the process I have chosen for this paper. The chapter will finish 
off with a presentation of different sources of error which can occur during this process. 
Chapter 4 – Data and analysis
This chapter cover the empirical part of the paper. The first part of the chapter will deal with 
statistics displaying the collected data and correlation analyses. I will use regression models in order 
to supply an answer to the problem definition as mentioned above. 
Chapter 5 – Discussion 
After going through the empirical data, I will in this chapter discuss findings in elucidation of 
relevant theory. Finally I will present a conclusion of the findings and a critique of the paper 
together with a suggestion to further research. 
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 2 Theory
 2.1 The Agency theory
To begin at the bottom, the basic governance problem is according to Thomsen (2008) the agency 
problem, which occurs because of the separation of between ownership and management. Agency 
theory is directed at the ubiquitous agency relationship between the agent, which can be for instance 
managers, act on behalf of the principal, i.e. the shareholders. Thus, the general problem of 
motivating one person or organization to act on behalf of another is known among economists as 
the principal-agent problem (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). A a common counter-measure to the 
problem is so-called incentive contracts, where individual incentives are strengthen by holding the 
managers at least partially responsible for the results of their actions, even though doing so exposes 
the managers to risk that could be more easily borne by an insurance company. 
The reason for establishing incentive contracts, is to avoid what we call moral hazard. Moral hazard 
occurs when managers abuse the responsibility given to him or her, in order to pursue personal 
interests. It happens when the action of the agent can not be observed by the principal. Moral hazard 
also illustrates a general principle; there is a trade off between risk and incentives. If you insure 
people against risk, they also lose the incentives to do anything about it (Thomsen, 2008). Another 
contracting problem is risk sharing and adverse selection. Adverse selection occurs when there are 
elements in the situation which are known to the agent, but not known to the principal. An example 
of adverse selection is when the shareholders via the board is going to hire a new manager. In this 
case there is no certain way of achieving the desirable amount of knowledge about the applicants. 
Hence, there is a risk involved that the person being hired is for instance lazy, not capable of 
handling stress, lies about his/hers achievements, qualities or weaknesses, hides a criminal record or 
similar. In other words, the shareholders and the board cannot measure how the person will actually 
perform the tasks as the new manager. 
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The key idea of agency theory is that the principal-agent relationship should reflect efficient 
organization of information and risk-bearing costs. We look at the contractual relationship between 
the agent and the principal as mentioned above, and we assume that managers have incentives to 
pursue a certain self interest, that they are risk averse, and that they are what economists call 
bounded rational. Bounded rationality is when a person makes a rational decision based on the 
accessible information, and where the action not necessarily is the same he would have done if he 
had access to all of the information needed in order to make an efficient decision (Thomsen, 2008). 
In addition to these assumptions, there are some organizational assumptions to be made. Agency 
theory assumes conflicting goals between the agency and the principal, or other participants. We 
also assume efficiency as the effectiveness criterion. The last assumption is that there is asymmetric 
information between the principal and the agent, which means that actors possesses different 
information relevant for the decision making. 
The problem domain is the relationships in which the principal and agent have partly differing goals 
and risk preferences. This can for instance be managerial compensation, regulation, impression 
management, leadership, vertical integration of the organization, whistle blowing and transfer 
pricing. 
Eisenhardt, M, K. (1989) sums up 10 propositions for the agency theory:
1. When the contract between the principal and agent is outcome based, the agent is more 
likely to behave in the interests of the principal.
The argument for this is that outcome based contracts between the principal and agent coalign the 
preferences of both of them. This is because the reward for both depend on the same actions, and 
therefore the conflict of self-interest between the principal and agent are reduced. 
2. When the principal has information to verify agent behaviour, the agent is more likely to 
behave in the interests of the principal. 
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This proposition implies that information system also have an affect on agent opportunism. In other 
words, if the principal has established efficient routines for supervising the agent, it will reduce the 
risk for agent opportunism if the agent is aware of the system. 
3. Information systems are positively related to behaviour-based contracts and negatively 
related to outcome-based contracts. 
And so forth according to Eisenhardt, M, K. (1989), the main focus of principal-agent focus 
literature  is to determining the optimal contract, behaviour versus outcome between the principal 
and the agent. The model assumes conflicting goals between the both, and that the agent is more 
risk averse than the principal. The reasoning behind the agent's risk aversion, is that the agent is 
unable to diversify the employment, where as the principal can diversify its investments. When 
establishing a contract, the principal has two options, either to establish information systems in 
order to control the agent's actions. Information systems could for instance be to budget systems or 
reporting procedures. The other option is to let the agent be responsible for the outcome  through 
the contract. In this case, there is a reduced need for information systems. Thus, this proposition 3 
has been formulated. 
4. Outcome uncertainty is positively related to behaviour-based contracts and negatively 
related to outcome-based contracts. 
An outcome-based contract motivates the agent for working in accordance with the principal's 
interests. But if there is uncertainty to whether the agent will fulfil the conditions as specified in the 
contract, the principal would have to establish information systems. 
5. The risk aversion of the agent is positively related to behaviour-based contracts and 
negatively related to outcome-based contracts. 
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This proposition is based on that if the agent is getting less risk averse, it becomes more attractive to 
pass risk on to the agent using an outcome-based contract. 
6. The risk aversion of the principal is negatively related to behaviour-based contracts and 
positively related to outcome-based contracts. 
Proposition 6 is more of the opposite than proposition 5. For instance, when the principal is getting 
less risk averse, it will be more attractive to enter a outcome-based contract. 
7. The goal conflict between principal and agent is negatively related to behaviour -based 
contracts and positively related to outcome-based contracts. 
If there is no goal conflict what so ever, the agent will be happy to work in full accordance with the 
preferences of the principal, regardless of whether his of hers efforts are being monitored. This 
proposition says that the more variance there is between the goals of the agent and the principal, the 
more attractive a behaviour-based contract becomes. 
8. Task programmability is positively related to behaviour-based contracts and negatively 
related to outcome-based contracts. 
Programmability is defined by Eisenhardt, M, K. (1989) as the degree to which appropriate  
behaviour by the agent can be specified in advance. For instance, a factory worker can be more 
easily programmed than someone with a complex and changing working environment. Proposition 
9 states that the more programmed the task, the more attractive it is to enter a behaviour-based 
contract, because information about the agent's behaviour is more readily determined. This is why a 
factory worker is more often paid by the hour, and for instance an entrepreneur which is paid as 
specified by an outcome-based contract. 
9. Outcome measurability is negatively related to behaviour-based contracts and positively 
related to outcome-based contracts. 
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When outcomes are measured with difficulty and a great deal of effort and resources, outcome-
based contract understandably becomes less attractive than behaviour-based contracts. The same 
goes vice versa; when outcomes are easily measured, outcome-based contracts becomes more 
attractive. 
10. The length of the agency relationship is positively related to behaviour-based contracts and 
negatively related to outcome-based contracts. 
For proposition 10, the same goes here as with proposition 9. If the principal and the agent engage 
in a long-term contract, it is more attractive to enter a behaviour-based contract. An outcome may in 
this case be difficult to measure over time, and it is probably more appropriate to monitor the 
agent's behaviour during the engagement. 
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 2.1.1 Theory overview
An overview of the agency theory is made by Eisenhardt, M, K. (1989) which is presented by 
Clarke (2008).
Agency theory overview
Key idea
Principal-agent relationships should reflect efficient 
organization of information and risk-bearing costs. 
Unit of analysis Contract between principal and agent.
Human assumptions
Self interested
Bounded rationality
Risk aversion
Organizational 
assumptions
Partial goal conflict among participants 
Efficiency as the effectiveness criterion
Information asymmetry between  principal and agent
Information assumption Information as a purchasable commodity
Contracting problem
Moral hazard
Adverse selection
Risk sharing
 Problem domain
Relationships in which the principal and agent have partly 
differing goals and risk preferences (e.g. compensation, 
regulation, leadership, impression management, whistle 
blowing, vertical integration, transfer pricing).
Figure 2.1: Overview Agency theory
23
 2.2  Incentive pay
Managerial compensation is according to Milgrom and Roberts (1992), and as previously stated, an 
agreement between an actor who possesses organizational ownership, control or risk (principal) and 
a person working on his behalf (agent). To avoid opportunism by the agent, meaning that the agent 
puts his own interests at the expense of the company objectives, proper use of incentives is 
necessary. Among the theories covering this topic, I have considered the Agent theory to be the 
most suitable for this paper. This chapter will be a theoretical foundation for the paper later on 
which deals with incentive pay. 
As Milgrom and Roberts continues, they claim that financial incentives must come from basing 
compensation on performance. On the other hand, efficient risk sharing requires that each person 
should bear only a fraction of the total risk, regardless of its source. Thus, performance-based 
compensation systems cause a loss from inefficient risk sharing. 
But why is incentives need to elicit the employee's best performance? Some employees might 
dislike their work tasks, and may neglect them unless they are held responsible for the results. But 
also even if the employee is hard working and dedicated to the job, he may still have priorities 
which are different from the employer's preferences. An example of an unfortunate consequence by 
the lack of incentives, is that the manager can give their employees too many privileges, as for 
instance time off, raises, or other benefits, on the expense of  efficiency and objectives. With an 
efficient incentive contract, the managers is given a personal encouragement to increase the level of 
effort by their subordinates (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). 
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 2.2.1 A mathematical example
Further, Milgrom and Roberts (1992) states that the general problem of motivating one person or an 
organization to act on behalf of another is what constitutes the principal-agent problem. In this case, 
they have composed a mathematical model of incentive compensation. 
In this model, they presume the following variables: 
I. e = effort level of an employee. Example could be energy expended or hours worked. e is 
not observable, but the employer can observe some incomplete indications of e. 
II. z = the indicator of the employee's efforts. Thus, z = e + x, where x is a random variable. 
III. y =  a second random variable which is not affected by e, but can be statically related to e 
and the observed z. 
IV. w = wage
V. w = α + β(e + x + γy) The compensation thus consists of a base amount (fixed pay), α, plus a 
portion that varies with the observed elements, z and y. β is the intensity of the incentives 
provided to the employee. A higher β means that the contract provides better incentives. The 
notion of γ is how much weight that is being put on the information variable y. 
This model assumes a linear relationship, which is easier to understand and administer. An actual 
employment contract involves several factors, but this model includes only those which are dealing 
directly with incentive pay. That is why the contract is specified by the parameters (e, α, β ,γ) that 
specify the level of effort (e) the employer expects to elicit and how the employee is to be 
compensated on the basis of performance. It also assumes that the employer is risk neutral. 
Based on this, we get the employee's certainty equivalent (CE), which is the expected compensation 
paid, minus the personal cost to the employee to supply effort, minus any risk premium. 
Mathematically formulated, this will be: α + β(e + x^ + ŷ) – 1/2rVar[α  β(e + x – γy)].  x^  and ŷ is 
the mean levels of x and y, and r is the employee's coefficient of absolute risk aversion. x^  and ŷ is 
set to be zero in order to simplify the model. This gives us: 
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Employee's certainty equivalent: α + βe -C(e) – 1/2rβ2Var(x-γy) 
The employer's certainty equivalent consists of the expected gross profits minus the expected 
compensation paid: 
Employer's certainty equivalent: P(e)- (α - βe)
We can see from this that both of the certainty equivalents consists of a constant, α,  which indicates 
a money transfer. The rest of the parameters are functions of the other variables. By applying the 
value maximizing principle for both actors we can specify a contract which maximizes the certainty 
equivalent for both the employer and the employee:
Total certainty equivalent: = P(e) – C(e) - 1/2rβ2Var(x-γy) 
But which choices of the contracts are feasible? The ideal choice would be if the employee would 
work hard, bear all of the risk, and accept no compensation, but to be realistic, Milgrom and 
Roberts says that the effort level would have to be compatible with the incentives that are provided 
to the employee. This model assumes that the employer can determine the employee's effort level 
based on the other parameters, (α, β, γ). 
Based on this, the level of incentives that maximizes both the employee and the employer's 
certainty equivalent is the equation called an incentive constraint, which is calculated by finding 
where the marginal total certainty equivalent equals zero:
Incentive constrain: β – C'(e) = 0
This equation must be satisfied by any feasible employment contract. It says that the employees 
select their level of effort so their marginal gain from working equal their marginal personal costs. 
The gain is the increased pay. The total certainty equivalent and its marginal values can be 
graphically illustrated in the following figure. 
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Figure 2.2: Increasing effort provided from e to ê requires increasing  β to  β'.
As we can see from this diagram, increased incentive pay in addition to the fixed pay should result 
in an increased level of effort by the employee if the contract is feasible and efficient. But we 
should notice that  α is not included in the total certainty equivalent at all, only in the certainty 
equivalents of each of the employee and the employer. After all, α determines only how the money 
is divided between the parties, and thus is being equalled out in the total. 
 2.3 Corporate ownership
To understand the mechanisms of corporate governance, we have to (among other factors) take a 
closer look at corporate ownership. Corporate ownership is according to Thomsen (2008) a set of 
rights concerning assets like user rights, profit rights, control rights, and transfer rights. He also 
emphasizes that there is a great deal of responsibility involved with these rights.  
In public listed companies, there are two characteristics of ownership structure. These are 
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ownership concentration and owner identities. In other words, this means who the owners are, and 
how much of the firm they own. According to Thomsen (2008, p. 87), the ownership concentration 
measures the power of shareholders to influence managers, the identity of the owners has 
implications for the for their objectives and the way they exercise their power. The interesting part 
for this thesis, is where Thomsen (2008) quotes Henry Hansmann (1988, 1996) when saying that 
this is reflected in company strategy with regard to profit goals, dividends, capital structure, and 
growth rates. Thomsen continues; ownership concentration can be measured as a first cut  
approximation by the share of the largest owner of total stock. This will be the starting point for the 
choice of variables which will be elaborated in chapter 3 about methodology. 
According to the agency theory, the optimal ownership structure implies a trade off between risk 
and incentive efficiency (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Because of this, larger owners will have 
stronger incentives to monitor managers and ensure that their interests are being maintained. It is 
then easy to make the conclusion that the optimal ownership structure will be one large 
shareholders, but if we take risk into consideration, the optimal structure will be different. A 
shareholder would probably like to diversify his or hers portfolio. Thus, a variable indicating the 
largest shareholder is expected to be concave, also of the reason that the minority shareholders' 
interests could be neglected if the largest owner becomes too large. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) say in their article Separation of ownership and control as presented in 
Clarke (2008) that if a company holds a very large part of the shares, managers could expropriate 
the wealth of minority shareholders. Based on this, a bell-shaped graph illustrating the relationship 
between ownership concentration, meaning the share of the largest owner, and economic 
performance can be presented. Economic performance is measured by firm value, accounting rates 
of profitability, shareholders value creation, or other variables (Thomsen, 2008). The shape of the 
graph depends on several factors, for instance the type of owner, which can be a person or a family, 
the government, a company or financial.
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Figure 2.3: Relationship between share of ownership and firm performance (Thomsen, 
2008)
This graph illustrates the relationship between share of ownership and the performance of the firm. 
As we can see, performance decreases after a certain ownership percentage, which is as mentioned 
determined by several factors (owner characteristics, etc.). Up to that point, larger share means that 
the owner will have strong incentives to maximize performance and influence the managers. But as 
Thomsen states; beyond that point the entrenchment effect kicks in. Beyond the maximum the 
owner becomes so large that he will might take advantage of his strong position. Examples of this 
can be to enjoy private benefits, or as a public energy company to emphasize stakeholder interests 
on the expense of firm performance. Additionally, the larger the share is, the more risk averse will 
the shareholder be because of an unbalanced portfolio. 
In the example of the Norwegian hydroelectric energy sector, most of the largest companies are 
either fully or partially owned by the Norwegian government. Governmental ownership is an 
institutional alternative to regulations (Thomsen, 2008). There are arguments saying that 
governmental ownership will emphasize stakeholder interests and political goals in a larger degree. 
Examples of political goals relevant for the energy industry are low output prices or employment. 
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The following section is mostly cited from the article of Jensen and Meckling (1976); “Theory of 
the firm: Managerial behaviour, agency, costs and ownership structure” which is reproduced in 
Clarke (2008). Jensen and Meckling start out by presenting their definition of property rights. 
According to them, the main basic focus is the determination of individual rights, and on the costs 
and rewards of an organization are being allocated among the participants of the organization. The 
specification is normally put down in a contract, which can be both implicit or explicit. By entering 
such a contract, the principal would like to reduce what Jensen and Meckling call agency costs.. 
These encompasses:
• costs in connection with monitoring the agents behaviour
• bonding expenditures by the agent
• the residual loss
Additionally, they say that agency costs occur in any situation involving cooperative efforts by two 
or more people. 
But how can we generalize the issue of the agency problem? Presumably, every relationship which 
includes an agent who acts on behalf of a principal in order to maximization the principal's welfare 
is subject to the agency problem. It is existing in all kinds of organizations and on all levels of the 
organization. 
Chapter 1 included among other things an elaboration on stakeholder influence on the ownership 
structure and decision procedures of Norwegian hydroelectric energy companies, where the state 
(hence the people) has either directly or indirectly control over the absolute majority of the largest 
companies. Even though there can be a large number of shareholders, ultimately they are all 
controlled by a governmental or municipal authority. Thus, in Norway there is a juridical and 
cultural basis (see chapter 2.4 for further elaboration) for emphasizing the social communities in 
the decision processes. An example of current interest was given with reference to Sogn Avis. In 
this case, the consideration of stakeholders are in contrast to the consideration of the company's 
profitability. De Wit and Meyer (2004) go thoroughly into this paradox when elaborating on that 
they call the paradox of profitability and responsibility and the underlying shareholder value 
perspective versus the stakeholder value perspective (De Wit & Meyer, 2004, pp. 597-509). They 
list a few things where the two perspectives are contradicting, for instance organizational purpose, 
how we look at the organization, measure of success, major difficulties, implementation of 
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corporate governance and social responsibility. To exemplify, a company competing in a relatively 
unregulated market such as a under typical American market conditions, will have different 
objectives and purpose than a typical Norwegian energy company. Where the American company 
places profitability over social responsibility, where the purpose of the organization is to serve the 
owner, and where the measure of success is the share price and dividends (shareholder value), the 
Norwegian energy company have it the other way around. Here, social responsibility is placed over 
profitability (even though profitability rates are unusually high in this industry), the purpose of the 
organization is to be a joint venture serving all parties involved, and the measure of success is 
satisfaction among the stakeholders. 
Blair (1995) present a similar case. She separates between a property conception and a social entity  
conception. She illustrates the property conception with an example from 1919, where the Dodge 
brothers sued Ford Motor Co. complaining that Henry Ford had suspended dividend payments. 
According to the Dodge brothers, they had the rights as shareholders to withdraw the profits. After 
all, the shareholders owned the company. The Michigan Supreme court agreed, stating that a 
businesses corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders 
(Clarke, 2008, p. 176). On the other hand, the modern social entity conception can be said to be in 
alignment with Scandinavian views, where the corporation has been described as constellations of  
interests rather than an instrument for personal acquest. The conflicting views between Scandinavia 
(and mainland Europe in general) and the USA is supported by Clarke (1998) where he illustrates 
the European view as stakeholder capitalism and the Anglo-American as stockholder capitalism.
 2.4 Corporate governance in Scandinavian and global perspectives
In the context of corporate governance, corporate ownership and incentives in the Norwegian 
hydroelectric energy industry, it is relevant to briefly present some comparisons on the fields of 
Scandinavian and global corporate governance. 
The Scandinavian countries, Norway, Sweden and Denmark are different from most other countries 
in the world in the sense that they are relatively scarcely populated (between five to eight millions), 
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and are homogeneous, which means that governance mechanisms like reputation and culture are 
more effective than in larger countries (Edling et al., (2007). In addition, they have had social 
democratic governments for a rather long period of time. Consequently, employee representation on 
boards is common to see in Scandinavian and especially Norwegian companies, and particularly 
companies of a larger size. 
The following table gives an international comparison of owner concentration, owner identities, 
incentive pay, and other variables of the Scandinavian countries (reproduced with a relevant 
selection of the variables). 
Germany Denmark Norway Sweden UK
Owner 
concentration
Medium High Medium Medium Low
Owner 
identity
Banks
Families
Families
Foundations
Coops
Governments
Foreign
Business 
groups
Institutions
Investors
Performance 
pay
(+) + + + -
Employee 
representation
+ + + + -
Figure 2.4: International comparison (Edling et al., 2007, presented in Thomsen, 2008). 
Here, we see that Norway stands out by having a large degree of governmental ownership. When it 
comes to performance pay (incentive pay) and owner concentration, there are no significant 
differences from the other countries. But, is must be specified that the subject of this paper, the 
Norwegian hydroelectric energy industry is far from aligned with other publicly listed companies 
when it comes to both structure and results. 
According to the source of the managerial pay (Proff) of this paper as we will see later on, many 
energy companies have had a high growth in CEO salaries the last few years. This is in accordance 
with Oxelheim and Randøy (2005), who's findings indicates that globalization increases the 
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managerial pay because managers are looking to other competing companies abroad, but in the 
same industry, where the level of CEO salaries is much higher. 
 2.5 The Agency theory and the Norwegian energy sector
So why would I use the agency theory as a theoretical basis for the research in this paper? First of 
all, I would, among other things and as elaborated in chapter 3, like to examine whether efficiency 
and the operating results of Norwegian hydroelectric energy companies are affected by the salaries 
given to the CEOs. When asking this question, I realize that many factors affects the answer, and 
many of the same factors are subject to elaboration in the agency theory. Some of these factors are 
summed up in an overview by Eisenhardt, K.M, (1989) as presented by Clarke (2008): 
Assumption
Perspectives and theories
Political Contingency
Organizational 
control
Transaction 
cost theory
Agency 
theory
Self 
interest
√ √ √
Goal 
conflict
√ √ √
Bounded 
rationality
√ √ √ √ √
Information 
asymmetry
√ √ √
Pre-eminence 
of efficiency
√ √ √ √
Risk 
aversion
√
Information as 
a commodity
√
Figure 2.5: Comparison of agency theory assumptions and organizational perspectives (Eisenhardt,  
K.M, (1989) as presented by Clarke (2008)).
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Most of these assumptions are highly relevant when discussing managerial compensation versus the 
revenues of any kind of business, including hydroelectric energy companies. For instance, some of 
the companies may have different kinds of incentive systems. As can be seen later, if on e company 
rapports it fixed wages to the CEO to be 50.000, it seems clear that the top manager also is 
receiving some other kind of compensation for his/her efforts. Agency theory states that if the 
compensation to the CEO is based on his results, he or she will have more incentives to lead the 
company to better results in order to improve his/her own wealth.
 2.6 Critique to the use of agency theory
Regardless of the relevance to the case of Norwegian hydroelectric energy companies, a general 
critique according to Thomsen (2008) is that even though agency theory is undoubted one of the 
most important theories in corporate governance, there one should apply alternative models to 
achieve a better and more nuanced understanding of the principal-agent relationship. We would 
have to look to the fields of psychology, economics, political science, sociology and  law to find 
theories which give a supplementary explanation of the relationship. 
 2.7 Chapter summary
The starting point of chapter 2 is agency theory and the principal-agent relationship and the focus 
has been on managerial compensation, with emphasizing on incentives and performance pay. I 
started out by elaborating on risk sharing, and continued about problems in the principal-agent 
relationship as a consequence from the imperfect risk distribution between the parties. Next,  I 
presented ten proposition for the agency theory based on the work by Eisenhardt, M, K. (1989). 
Secondly, I elaborated more on incentive pay. I presented mathematical basis for incentive 
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contracts. I then moved on to corporate ownership, elaborating more on the matter of separation of 
ownership and control. In the same context I chose to put corporate governance in an international 
perspective, presenting a comparison to other nearby countries in northern Europe. Then I moved 
on to giving a brief reasoning on why I have chosen agency theory as a theoretical basis for this 
paper, before finishing off with a critique to the choice of theory.  
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 3 Methodology
 3.1 Introduction
Research is about achieving new reliable knowledge and interpret the surrounding world. The 
theories and methods can vary between the different fields of science, but the scientific 
requirements remains the same. The research process, no matter which level we are at, demands 
initially a thought-through consideration of previously works in the same field. This is for 
developing own ideas in such way that they becomes reliable, new and significant (Olsson & 
Sörensen, 2003). 
There are some requirements to the research method being used in order to be able to use it in 
scientific works. To chose the best method we have to use the problem of this paper as a starting 
point. Additionally, the choice of method has to be in accordance with the reality which we are 
examining. The collected data being used in scientific works has to be accurate, and it is important 
that the research process and all of the procedures are transparent and accessible for the reader. The 
most prominent reason for this is that others should be able to test the result of the research for the 
posterity (Lund & Haugen, 2006).
Still, it has to be said that the choice of method is not always obvious, and according to Zikmund 
(2003) it is because there is never a right method. The choice will depend on how much time and 
resources we have available. Therefore it is important to consider all of the existing methods and 
decide on one with regards to what is needed in the context. 
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The research process
The following table is the different steps in the research process according to Lund  & Haugen 
(2006). These stages does not fully match the structure of this paper, but make a good basis. 
Stage I • Background
• The objective of the research
• Problem definition
• Theory
Stage II • Validity criteria
• Pilot studies
• Ethical criteria
Stage III • Methodical approach
• Population
• Design
• Instruments (i.e. questionnaires, interview guide, tests, etc.)
• Situation/context and time for the research 
Stage IV • Collecting the data (i.e. numbers, observations, etc.) 
• Analysis of the data (i.e. statistical analysis, text analysis, etc.) 
• Result
Stage V • Summing up 
• Discussing the result in comparison to other research/theory
• Critique and weaknesses to the research
• Ideas for further research 
Figure 1.2: The research process and its stages
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 3.2 Problem definitions
Maybe the most difficult stages in the research process is to identify and determine the problem or 
question which we would like to examine. The starting point does not have to be a problem, but 
rather a question about something we would like to have answer. 
In this assignment, the main focus is to see if there is any coherence between ownership 
concentration, incentives and profitability in Norwegian energy companies which are producing 
hydroelectric power. To be able to examine this relationship closer, it is necessary to ask a few 
questions (Gripsrud og Olsson 2000): 
1. Which decisions do we wish to make based on this research?
2. How will the empirical result affect these decisions? 
3. Which information is required in order to make the decisions? 
4. What is the purpose with this research?
5. Do we have everything that is required to make the decision? 
Based on these questions, I would like to examine the following: 
• Does the number of shareholders and the size of their stake affect the profitability of the 
energy companies? 
• Does the managerial compensation have any effect on the annual results of the energy 
companies? 
• Does the identity of the shareholders, whether they are of a private or public kind, affect the 
incentive systems of the energy companies? 
The purpose with this paper, will be to increase the understanding of the deep-rooted public 
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ownership structure,  of Norwegian energy companies. The decisions being made in this paper, can 
make it easier to do a comparison with regards to profitability, between state owned companies and 
companies dominated by private shareholders. In order to make a reliable conclusion, it is required 
to control whether external elements are not affecting the results. 
These considerations lead to the problem definition of this paper as mentioned in chapter 1: 
Is there coherence between managerial pay, ownership structure, ownership concentration 
and profitability of Norwegian hydroelectric energy companies? 
 3.2.1 Variables
When the problem has been defined and the purpose and hypotheses have been specified,  the next 
step is to determine the variables. A variable is a concrete representation of a concept, and can be 
both abstract or concrete. If they are abstract we would have to operationalize the term based on 
previous research on the same topic. As we will see in this case, there is no need to operationalize 
the variables since they are already based on relatively accessible financial numbers.  An 
independent variable's meaning is to predict  the dependent variable. Time plays an important role 
in determining the dependent and independent variables (Olson & Sørensen, 2003). In this case, I 
am looking for a relationship between shareholder concentration and profitability. Thus, I have 
chosen the following variables based on my problem 
Dependent variable:
The dependent variable in this paper is profitability. More specific, the profitability of the 
companies are in this context observed by the operating result expressed as a percentage. First of 
all, the reason why I have not chosen the annual result is that some of the companies have had huge 
investments which give a inaccurate illustration of the industry. By focusing on the operating result, 
I am able to isolate the profitability of the daily operations which is much more comparable 
between businesses in the sector. 
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Secondly, I have chosen the operating result expressed as a percentage of two reasons:
 1. Together with the ROI, the operating result is a clear indication of the profitability of a 
company. The results can be explained and classified as follows:
 a) The percentage is calculated by (Operating result) x 100 / (Sum of running incomes). 
This formula shows how much of each currency unit is left after deducting running costs 
(Vurdering av nøkkeltall – Resultat av driften i %, Proff).
 b) This figure shows the evaluation of operating result percentages. As we will see later, the 
Norwegian companies producing hydraulic power have some peculiar numbers when it 
comes to this table. 
Not satisfactory Weak Satisfactory Good Very good
< 0 % 0 - 2 % 3 - 4 % 5 - 7 % > 7  %
Figure 3.2: Evaluation of key numbers (Proff.no). 
 2. Of all the available financial numbers, these ones are the most accessible and does not 
require a large amount of time and calculations to achieve. With regards to the purposed 
amount of time and the large number of companies to examine, the operating result is the 
most practical and adequate to base this paper on. 
Independent variable:
The independent variable in this context is shareholder concentration of the ownership structure of 
the companies. I would like to see whether this variable has any influence on the dependent 
variable; profitability.  
The reason why the choice of independent variable is ownership concentration, is that in the 
hydroelectric energy industry, companies can be argued to be relatively homogeneous. This is again 
because most of them was originally founded to supply electricity to nearby households and 
industries. Additionally, electricity is no doubt a homogeneous product. The most prominent 
difference with the exception of a few large companies and Statkraft, lies in the ownership structure 
with regards to the number of shareholders and the existence of a dominant owner. 
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The independent variables of this paper are:
• Fixed pay to the CEO of the company
• The number of owners
• The size of the largest owner
Control variables
This kind of variables are widely used in research processes to avoid misleading results. By using 
control variables, we can assure that no other factor is influencing the relationship between the 
dependent and independent variable(s). Based on this, I have decided on the following control 
variable: 
• Total revenue to the company as an indicator for the size. If it turns out that the size of the 
company affects the result, we might say that there can for instance be benefits about being 
large that gives the company higher profitability. In example, a large company like Statkraft 
will have the power to attract the very best energy managers in the industry, and this can not 
be reflected in this research. 
 3.3 Hypothesis and testing
The problem of the paper is as mentioned earlier seen with regards to the relevant theory, and it will 
lead to one or more hypotheses. A hypothesis can be said to be an assumption or a fundamental 
idea. A hypothesis is formed by putting different concepts in relation to each other. A scientific 
hypothesis is an assumption made to explain the relationship between two or more concepts (Olson 
& Sørensen, 2003), or as  Lund and Haugen (2006) states in one sentence;  experimentally  
statements about how something is [or behaves]; a kind of explained guessing
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There are many requirements for a hypothesis to be used in scientific research (Zikmund, 2003):
• It must be possible to test the hypotheses empirically by different statistical methods. 
• One can reject the hypothesis in case the hypothesis is not being supported by the research. 
• The person defining the hypothesis can not be affected by personal or external factors when 
formulating it. The hypothesis must be formulated in an unbiased matter. 
• All of the hypotheses must be formulated based on relevant and acknowledged theory, or 
previous research on on the same topic. 
• The hypothesis has to be clear regarding the relationship between the different variables, 
both in positive or negative sense and under what conditions. 
• The variables in the hypothesis have to be operazionalized. 
In chapter 4 I will take a closer look at the relationship between ownership concentration and 
profitability of Norwegian hydroelectric, whether higher concentration of owners, meaning fewer 
and larger shareholders, implies higher profitability as shown by operating results. 
This is why I have come to the following hypotheses as mentioned in chapter 1: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): There is a positive relationship between the amount of fixed pay to the 
CEO and the profitability of the company.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): There is a positive relationship between ownership concentration and the 
operating result of the company. 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): There is a negative relationship between the number of owners and the 
operating result of the company.
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 3.4 Research design
The choice of research design will depend on the problem which we would like to give an answer 
to. The design will determine the choice of data collection and analysis method. Research design is 
primarily categorized in the following types according to Otto Andersen 1: 
1. Causal and descriptive design: 
As the name indicates, this kind of design is when we want to prove a cause and effect between 
different variables. Normally causal design is used in quantitative researches, and appear as more 
experimental. One assumption of causal design is that there are already theories about the topic 
being examined. 
2. Explorative design: 
This kind of design is appropriate in case the goal is to achieve new perspectives on the topic we are 
looking at. This design is of a qualitative nature, and can be used when we do not have a clear 
understanding of the problem. 
 
3. Descriptive design:
Descriptive design is used to prove a relation between variables, to describe characteristics of for 
instance a group of people,  to determine a frequency of events or similar observations. The goal is 
to measure the variables and determine a relationship between them. Descriptive design requires a 
clear specification of the who, what, where, when, and how of the research. 
In order to measure or estimate causal effects there are three main groups of designs; real 
experimental design, quasi-experimental design and non-experimental design (Lund, 2006). 
1 Otto Andersen: Research Methods, Lectures at the University of Agder, 08.04.09. 
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 3.5 Data collection procedure
Before we start on the data collection, I would like to elaborate on the categorization of data; 
primary data and secondary data. The difference is that primary data is being collected exclusively 
according to the problem. There are some different kinds of collection methods which can be used 
for this: 
1. Questionnaires
2. Observations
3. Interviews
On the other hand, secondary data is describes as data which is being collected for other purposes 
than the original research problem. This kind of data can be easily accessible for the public, but it is 
questionable whether the quality and reliability of the data is good enough. 
The data collected in this paper does not fit perfectly into neither of the categorizations. My data is 
solely collected from a publicly accessible database called Proff. Even though the information is not 
collected from the companies themselves there is no reason to question the reliability of the data. 
Every registered Norwegian joint-stock company is obliged to report a variety of information to the 
government every year, and much of this information is accessible at www.proff.no. Accessible 
information is for instance:
• Financial and corporate information
• Complete accounting data, figures and analyses, including for instance: 
◦ Operating result
◦ Annual results
◦ Corporate taxes
◦ Return on equity (ROI), (%)
◦ Liquidity ratio, (%)
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◦ Equity capital, (%)
◦ Depths, fixed assets and liquid assets
◦ Dividend, etc.
◦ Managerial pay (fixed) with history plus other wage costs. 
• List of owners.
• List of board members and their date of birth (including the CEO).
• Misc. proclamations and news about the company.
 3.6 Scale
The scale consists of the levels nominal, ordinal, interval. When running the analyses in SPSS we 
do not need any “stronger” scale than interval, so the question of ratio is not relevant. The SPSS 
program does not separates between the highest levels; interval and ratio (Wenstøp, 2003). 
 3.7 Population and methods of sampling 
Hair et al. (2007) states that sampling involves a procedure of selecting elements from a larger 
group (population) in order to infer something about the larger group. They mention at the same 
time that a population is defined as the totality of cases that conform to some designated 
specifications. The specifications define the elements that belong to the totality of cases, and those 
that are to be excluded. 
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The sampling method  normally involves six steps:
 1. Defining the population. Populations normally consist of only one kind of observation unit, 
but can in some cases include different types of units. The population is sometimes referred 
to as the level of generalization. To define the population, we have to look at:
 a) time boundaries
 b) geographic boundaries
 c) type of units
 d) specific characteristics
 2. The next step involves a sampling frame. This is a listing of elements from which the actual  
sample will be drawn. 
 3. The third step is selecting a sampling procedure, within there are two main categories; 
probability samples and non-probability samples. The difference is that in the first category 
there is a given chance for each element to be picked out of its population or sample frame. 
With the latter option, it is impossible to estimate the probability of the each element to be a 
part of the sample frame. This could be a problem since there is no way of knowing whether 
the sample is representative for the whole sample frame. 
 4. All of this leads us to the next step, which is determining the sample size. There are many 
factors affecting the question of sample size. These can be time and money available, 
number of categories, the homogeneity of the population, acceptable magnitude of error, or 
type of sampling method. 
 5. Next to determining the sample size is collecting the data. When collecting the data there are 
two kinds of errors that often arises:
 a) Sampling errors. Hair et al (2007) describes sampling errors as the difference between 
the observed values of a variable and the long-turn average of the observed values in 
repetitions of the measurement. In other words, sampling errors can be reduced by 
increasing the size of the sample. 
 b) Non-sampling errors. These errors can be any error arising in the research. 
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In this case, the population is set to be every company producing hydroelectric power which has a 
significant level of turnover. That is why I have chosen to examine all of the companies which 
turnover are exceeding NOK 100.000.000. The number of companies in my population can in 
addition be representative for the rest of the hydroelectric energy industry in Norway, even though 
that is not taken into consideration. I will primarily just examine the largest companies. And assume 
that the number of companies which meet the turnover criterion is large enough to point out 
possible and reliable causalities. Additionally, and as mentioned in step four above; there can be 
many factors affecting the sample size. In the hydroelectric energy industry, the degree of 
homogeneity of the companies is remarkably high compared to other industries. 
 3.8 Statistical method
To be able to answer the hypotheses in this paper, I would have to chose a suitable statistical 
method. This is required to simplify the collected data and make it easier to draw conclusions based 
on the data. The statistical method will help indicating a relationship between the dependent 
variable and the independent. A regression analysis will in this case be suitable (Wenstøp, 2003). 
 3.8.1 Regression analysis
Regression analysis is widely used in economic research, and its purpose is to reveal coherence or 
relationships between two or more variables. We assume in regression analysis that there are one or 
more independent variables influencing the dependent variable. The following section will be a 
presentation of how this analysis works (Wenstøp, 2003). 
In order to see if the regression analysis of this paper is sufficient, we would have to examine the 
beta (β), the significant, R2 and R2  (adjusted) of the regression equation. 
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The multiple regression model: 
Yi = α + β1x1 + β2x2 + β3x3... + βkxk + ε
Y = the dependent variable which will be explained by the independent variables. 
x = independent variable (also called explanatory variable)
α = constant (?)
β = shows the change in the dependent variable if an independent variable is being de- or increased 
by one unit. 
ε = shows the remaining change which cannot be explained by the chosen variables 
As we see here, Y is the dependent variable, and the model explains the effect of independent 
variables to Y, which is why they are called explanatory variables. By using regression analysis, we 
are able to calculate α and β, which are the parameters. α shows the value of Y when the x('s) are set 
to be 0. β indicates the change in the dependent variable if the independent variable (x) changes by 
one unit. 
A critique to the model is that we cannot include as many explanatory variables as desired. When 
including variables with minimal effect on Y, the model becomes less accurate. And vice versa, 
when excluding variables with significant effect on Y, the parameters will be calculated incorrectly, 
and ε will be incorrect as well. 
To say whether the model is accurate enough and suitable for further use, we could use 
R2(adjusted). R2 is the explanatory degree or power to the regression, and by dividing R2 with the 
number of degrees of freedom we get R2(adjusted):
R2(adjusted) = (1 – ((N – 1) / (N – K - 1)) x (1 – R2))
R2(adjusted) will not be needed in this study since my sample is equal to the entire population. 
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Before I move on, there are five assumptions to be made about the regression model:
1. E(ε) = 0. This implies that the expected (E) value of ε is equal to 0. 
2. Var (ε) = O2, meaning that the variance of ε is unknown. The correlation (εi, εj) is set to be = 
0, which means that  ε of the different observations are independent. 
3. Ỹi = ά + βx +  ε, there is a linear relationship between the dependent variable and the 
independent variable. 
4. ε i = N(0,O2). This means that  ε is normally distributed with no expectation of a constant 
varians. 
5. In addition to this, we assume that there does not exist any multi correlation between the 
different variables of the model. If there should in case exist a multi correlation, this will 
mean that the parameters would not be correct, and that the result from the examination 
would be incorrect. A correlation between two variables shows how they react to one 
another, and to avoid an incorrect result we should check for any multi correlation 
(Wenstøp, 2003). 
 3.9 Sources of errors
For the findings of this paper to have any value, it is necessary to examine for any sources of errors 
which can occur during the process. It is relevant to examine the reliability and validity. The degree 
of reliability and validity need to be high in order to approve the findings of a research. 
The terms can not be considered independently from each other. They are closely related in the way 
that one of them indicates whether we measure the right thing, and the other indicates the quality of 
the measurement. In a research process, we don not know the real value of what we are examining, 
so we have to consider the possible sources of error which can occur. Mathematically it is 
formulated like the following:
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X0 = Xt + Xs + Xr
• X0 = Is the observed value which we find among our sample.
• Xt = Is the true value. Ideally, this is the value we would like to discover. 
• Xs = Consists of systematic errors. These errors occur as a result of incorrect administration 
of the research, and errors as a result of the lack of responses from the participants of the 
survey. This kind of error can not necessarily be eliminated by increasing the size of the 
population (Zikmund, 2003). 
• Xr = Are random errors which can occur, and are caused by random variations in the 
population. This source of error can in contrast to systematic errors be avoided by increasing 
the size of the population.  
In the case of the population of this paper, we can assume that at least Xr = 0, since I am looking at 
each and all of the companies with revenues exceeding NOK 100 millions. We can also assume that 
Xs is low since I was able to receive information about all of the companies. Thus, my sample is 
equal to the true population (Wenstøp, 2003).
 3.9.1 Reliability
Reliability is the degree of correspondence with measurement carried out with the same instrument. 
If the result remains the same from time to time, there is a high degree of reliability. For instance, 
reliability can be measured by conducting a test-retest method, where the measurement is done at a 
certain time, and repeated later on.
When it comes to reliability, the requirement is that: X0 = Xt + Xs
In other words, if the observed value equals the true value plus systematic errors, the result satisfies 
the requirement of reliability. The amount of Xs must be low in order for the result to be reliable. 
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As mentioned above, since I have examined all of the companies with revenues more than the 
chosen limit, the chance of random errors has been eliminated, thus the result can be said to be 
reliable (Wenstøp, 2003).  
 3.9.2 Validity
As important as having a high degree of reliability, it is also important to ensure the validity of the 
research. Validity is ensured if the procedures or instrument of measurement are able to measure the 
right or relevant things (Olson & Sörensen, 2003). 
Validity is categorized in several ways. 
• First of all, we have face validity, which is the “obvious” deduction of an observed value. 
For instance, if we would know the date of birth of a manager, we could also easily 
determine his age. 
• Content validity means that we measure the whole area of interest, and that is is consistent. 
For example, by measuring ownership concentration, it is relevant to measure not only the 
number of shareholders, but also the size of the largest owner. 
• Criterion validity is the most secure way of measuring validity (Olson & Sörensen, 2003). 
This means that we compare the result with another criterion which measures the same thing 
(golden standard). 
• Consensual validity implies that there are consensus among several “experts” that the results 
are valid. 
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• Predictive validity encompasses the ability of the measurement instruments or procedures to 
predict future behaviour of what we are examining. Predictive validity is measured by 
comparing the predictions with the actual outcomes. 
• Construct validity is high when there is a high degree of correlation between the 
measurement instruments and other closely related terms or instruments. 
The criterion for validity is that X0 = Xt, ergo the observed value equals the true value. In other 
words, we would have to avoid both systematic and random errors in order to satisfy this 
requirement. 
As mentioned above, I have received the data from a public database (Proff.no) which offers 
comprehensive corporate and  financial information in addition to information about owners. The 
information is coming from the Brønnøysund Register Centre, which is an administrative agency 
responsible for a number of national control and registration schemes for business and industry.  
The overarching goal of the centre is to improve the conditions for financial security and efficiency 
for business and industry, and the public at large (Brønnøysundregisteret). This database must be 
said to have as large degree of validity as one can expect when examining both incentive systems 
and ownership structure of Norwegian energy companies.  
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 4 Analysis
 4.1 Introduction
To provide an answer to the hypotheses in this paper, I have conducted an empirical survey. This 
has been done by using the statistical program SPSS. 
This chapter will be dedicated to the result of the empirical analysis. The first part of the chapter 
will be a presentation of the descriptive statistics. Following part will be about a correlation 
analysis, which examines any correlation between the variables. An important aspect correlation 
analysis is also if there should exist any multi correlation between the variables. The last part is a 
presentation of different regression analyses. 
 4.2 Descriptive presentation of data
Descriptive Statistics
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
Revenues 65 100082000 25465000000 1.35E9 3.495E9
Operating_result 65 -56.00 76.20 39.2769 30.09289
Fixed_pay 65 50000 7685000 1179015.38 1060199.679
Number_owners 65 1 23 4.18 5.414
Owner_concentration 65 10 100 70.38 32.728
Valid N (listwise) 65
Figure 4.1: Descriptive statistics of the data material
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This table displays the number of observations of this paper. The number is 74, and these are the 74 
hydroelectric energy companies in Norway with the highest revenues. Since 9 companies have 
missing values I have chosen to exclude them from the table. The number of observations is 
therefore 65.  The table also displays the following:
• Mean. This value is the sum of observed values divided by the number of observations. 
Generally, this number should be regarded as potentially inaccurate. Extreme values can 
make the result less representative than if the values are excluded. 
We can see that the mean operating result is approximately 39 %, which is unusually high 
for any industry. This number is categorized as “very good” if it exceeds 7 % (Proff.no). 
• Minimum and maximum values. Taking a closer look at the minimum and maximum 
values can help us draw some conclusion about the descriptive statistical data. Here we can 
see whether the mean value has been distorted by any extreme values. For instance, an 
operating result of 76 % could normally be regarded as an extreme value, but since such a 
large number is not a unique case in this collection of data, I will let it be.
• Standard deviation. This number indicates the spreading of the data material. Since a large 
standard deviation implies a high degree of spreading from the mean value, this number has 
to be closely evaluated. For instance, the standard deviation indicates any extreme values. If 
the standard deviation value is large, there can be extreme values making the mean higher 
than usual. 
 4.3 Analysis – correlation 
Correlation is a way of indicating the covariation between variables. I have conducted a correlation 
analysis in order to examine the correlation between the revenues, operating result, fixed pay, 
number of owners and owner concentration. In the regression analysis presented later on, it is 
important that there is not any multi correlation between the variables. A correlation analysis will 
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also show the significance of the independent variables I have chosen. Each of the independent 
variables should correlate to the dependent variable. 
Correlations
Operating 
result Fixed pay
Number of 
owners
Owner 
concentration
Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Operating 
result
1 .093 -.038 .277*
.461 .766 .026
65 65 65 65
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Fixed pay .093 1 .146 -.184
.461 .245 .143
65 65 65 65
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Number of 
owners
-.038 .146 1 -.675**
.766 .245 .000
65 65 65 65
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Owner 
concentration
.277* -.184 -.675** 1
.026 .143 .000
65 65 65 65
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Figure 4.2: Correlation matrix
A correlation coefficient will be between -1 and +1. If the coefficient is -1, the correlation is said to 
be perfect negative. And vice versa, if the correlation is +1, is is perfect positive. 
Since we can not observe any high degree of correlation between the independent variables, we can 
assume that there is not any multi correlation in the matrix. We can also see that the independent 
variables have a small degree of either positive or negative correlation to the dependent variable, 
which implies that the independent variables do not affect the dependent variable in any significant 
degree. 
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 4.4 Regression analysis
This part contains different kinds of regression models I have used in order to make a conclusion. It 
is where I examine how each of the variables are affecting the dependent variable (operating result). 
I will also examine these relationships with the use of control variables. This is because I would like 
to examine if there are any underlying variables which can be affecting the dependent variable.  
As mentioned above, I have chosen to remove 9 observations of the reason that there were missing 
values. If I would include them, the of the results of the regression analyses could be 
misrepresented. After I removed the observations, I ran the test again to see whether the result was 
changed. 
There are some factors which will be evaluated in the next parts: 
1. The level of significance. This is the probability for being wrong. In this paper, I have 
chosen the level of significance to be 5 %. 
2. t-test. The t-test is a statistical test which shows if each of the variables will have a 
significant effect on the dependent variables. 
3. F-test. The F-test is a statistical test which compares the variance between two dimensions; 
MS(between) and MS(within). The larger the sizes of these are, the higher is the probability 
for the result being significant. 
4. Regression coefficient R2 (adjusted). This is the explanatory factor of this model, and it 
should lie closer to 1. It is in contradiction to R2 adjusted for the number of independent 
variables. It shows how much the independent variables can explain the variance of the 
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dependent variable. As mentioned before, since I examine every single company with 
revenues exceeding NOK 100 million, I have no need for basing any decision on this 
coefficient.
5. The coefficient β of each of the independent variables. This value shows us how each of 
the independent variables are being effected by the dependent variable. 
6. P > t. P is the level of significant of each of the variables in the model. It tells us the 
significance of the different variables, and should ideally be closer to 0. 
 4.4.1 Managerial compensation
In this first part I would like to examine in what degree, if any, managerial pay and ownership 
concentration is affecting the operating result of the companies. Based on this, I have made a few 
models which will help me make a conclusion about that:
Models
Variables being used 
in the models
#1
Operating result
Managerial pay
#2
Operating result 
Managerial pay
Number of owners
Owner concentration
Total revenues of the 
companies
Figure 4.3: Model overview #1
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In model 1 I have chosen only to include the fixed pay managers receive annually for the 
responsibility of being the CEO. In model 2 I have chosen to examine the relationship between the 
owner concentration and the operating result, whether the number of owners and the size of the 
largest shareholder are factors that affect the operating result.
Model Summary
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate
dim
ensi
on0
1 .093a .009 -.007 30.19931
2 .394b .155 .099 28.56446
a. Predictors: (Constant), Fixed_pay
b. Predictors: (Constant), Number of owners, Revenues, Fixed pay, Owner concentration
Figure 4.4: Explanatory factors
As we can see from figure 4.4, model 1 has a very low degree of explanatory power, and model 2 
has a medium degree of explanatory power (R2). The powers are ranging from 0.9 % to 15.5 %  (-
0,7 % and 9,9 % for R2 (adjusted)). We also see that for both R2  and R2  (adjusted) the values are 
increasing from model 1 to model 2. This means that the variation of the control variables would be 
increasing the explanatory power for the operating result of the 65 largest hydroelectric energy 
companies in Norway if I would have used a sample instead of the whole population. 
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Coefficientsa
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients
Standardized 
Coefficients
t Sig.
95,0% Confidence Interval for B
B
Std. 
Error Beta Lower Bound Upper Bound
1 (Constant) 36.164 5.626 6.428 .000 24.921 47.407
Fixed pay 2.640E-6 .000 .093 .741 .461 .000 .000
a. Dependent Variable: Operating result
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients
Standardized 
Coefficients
t Sig.
95,0% Confidence 
Interval for B
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound Upper Bound
2 (Constant) .559 14.941 .037 .970 -29.327 30.445
Owner 
concentration
.398 .154 .433 2.584 .012 .090 .706
Revenues 1.262E-9 .000 .147 1.147 .256 .000 .000
Fixed pay 2.779E-6 .000 .098 .771 .444 .000 .000
Number owners 1.363 .900 .245 1.514 .135 -.438 3.163
a. Dependent Variable: Operating result
Figure 4.6:
The information in Figure 4.6 tells us that none of the variables have any significant influence on 
the dependent variable, which we can see by the t-value of the variables. In this case, the t-values 
are relatively low, except when it comes to owner concentration in model 2 which might indicate a 
relationship. 
ANOVAb
Modell Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression 501.357 1 501.357 .550 .461a
Residual 57455.879 63 911.998
Total 57957.235 64
a. Predictors: (Constant), Fixed_pay
b. Dependent Variable: Operating_result
Modell Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
2 Regression 9001.545 4 2250.386 2.758 .036a
Residual 48955.690 60 815.928
Total 57957.235 64
a. Predictors: (Constant), Owner_concentration, Revenues, Fixed_pay, Number_owners
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ANOVAb
Modell Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression 501.357 1 501.357 .550 .461a
Residual 57455.879 63 911.998
Total 57957.235 64
a. Predictors: (Constant), Fixed_pay
b. Dependent Variable: Operating_result
Modell Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
2 Regression 9001.545 4 2250.386 2.758 .036a
Residual 48955.690 60 815.928
Total 57957.235 64
b. Dependent Variable: Operating_result
Figure 4.7:
As seen from this table, none of the models have a significant F-value. By this, we can say the these 
models are not very good, and do not support the hypothesis that higher pay influences the 
operating result of the companies on a 5 %-level. 
 4.4.2 Ownership concentration
Models Variables being used in the models
#1
Operating result
Number of owners
#2
Operating result 
Owner concentration
#3
Operating result 
Managerial pay
Number of owners
Owner concentration
Total revenues of the company
Figure 4.8: Model overview #2
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The second hypothesis deals with owner concentration and its effect on the operating result of the 
companies. The ownership concentration means the size of the largest shareholder. 
Model Summary
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate
dim
ensi
on0
1 .038a .001 -.014 30.30927
2 .277b .076 .062 29.14797
3 .394c .155 .099 28.56446
a. Predictors: (Constant), Number of owners
b. Predictors: (Constant), Owner concentration
c. Predictors: (Constant), Number of owners, Revenues, Fixed pay, Owner concentration
Figure 4.9: Explanatory factors
Figure 4.9 tells us that also these models have low explanatory power, ranging from 0,1% to 15,5 % 
(-1,4 % to 9,9 % for R2 (adjusted)). Also here, the values are increasing from model one to model 3, 
meaning that the explanatory power would have been increasing if the companies in this paper 
would be a representative sample.
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Coefficientsa
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients
Standardized 
Coefficients
t Sig.
95,0% Confidence 
Interval for B
B Std. Error Beta
Lower 
Bound
Upper 
Bound
1 (Constant) 40.153 4.765 8.426 .000 30.630 49.676
1.189Number of 
owners
-.209 .700 -.038 -.299 .766 -1.608
a. Dependent Variable: Operating result
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients
Standardized 
Coefficients
t Sig.
95,0% Confidence 
Interval for B
B Std. Error Beta
Lower 
Bound
Upper 
Bound
2 (Constant) 21.421 8.432 2.541 .013 4.613 38.230
Owner 
concentration
.280 .106 .298 2.652 .010 .070 .491
a. Dependent Variable: Operating result
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients
Standardized 
Coefficients
t Sig.
95,0% Confidence 
Interval for B
B Std. Error Beta
Lower 
Bound
Upper 
Bound
3 (Constant) .559 14.941 .037 .970 -29.327 30.445
Owner 
concentration
.398 .154 .433 2.584 .012 .090 .706
Revenues 1.262E-9 .000 .147 1.147 .256 .000 .000
Fixed pay 2.779E-6 .000 .098 .771 .444 .000 .000
Number of owners 1.363 .900 .245 1.514 .135 -.438 3.163
a. Dependent Variable: Operating result
Figure 4.10:
Figure 4.10 shows us that the constant is significant in all three models on a 5 %-level. One variable 
in a model had a considerable high significant level. This variable is the number of owners in model 
1. When it comes to model 2, it seems like there is a coherence between the existence of a large 
owner and the operating result in the companies, where the t-value is 2.652 and the significance 
level is 0,12. This is also possible to see in model 3.
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ANOVAb
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression 82.180 1 82.180 .089 .766a
Residual 57875.055 63 918.652
Total 57957.235 64
a. Predictors: (Constant), Number_owners
b. Dependent Variable: Operating_result
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
2 Regression 4432.179 1 4432.179 5.217 .026c
Residual 53525.057 63 849.604
Total 57957.235 64
c. Predictors: (Constant), Owner_concentration
b. Dependent Variable: Operating_result
Modell Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
3 Regression 9001.545 4 2250.386 2.758 .036d
Residual 48955.690 60 815.928
Total 57957.235 64
d. Predictors: (Constant), Owner_concentration, Revenues, Fixed_pay, Number_owners
b. Dependent Variable: Operating_result
Figure 4.11:
We can see from this table that none of the models have any significant F-value, except model 2 
where the F-value is 5.217. Still, the value is weak. 
With regards to figure 4.10 where model 2 displayed a t-value at 2.652, and despite the low 
explanatory power of the model, there can be basis for arguing that there can be a weak positive 
relationship between the existence of a large and dominant owner and the operating result of 
Norwegian hydroelectric energy companies. 
Since all of these regression analyses told us that the explanatory power increased the more 
variables I included, I have chosen to present a new correlation analysis containing all of the 
variables. 
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Correlations
Revenues
Operating 
result Fixed pay
Number 
owners
Owner 
concentration
Revenues Pearson Correlation 1 .243 .265* -.034 .183
Sig. (2-tailed) .051 .033 .789 .145
N 65 65 65 65 65
Operating 
result
Pearson Correlation .243 1 .093 -.038 .277*
Sig. (2-tailed) .051 .461 .766 .026
N 65 65 65 65 65
Fixed pay Pearson Correlation .265* .093 1 .146 -.184
Sig. (2-tailed) .033 .461 .245 .143
N 65 65 65 65 65
Number 
owners
Pearson Correlation -.034 -.038 .146 1 -.675**
Sig. (2-tailed) .789 .766 .245 .000
N 65 65 65 65 65
Owner 
concentration
Pearson Correlation .183 .277* -.184 -.675** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .145 .026 .143 .000
N 65 65 65 65 65
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Figure 4.12: Correlation matrix with all variables
We can see from this table that there is no significant correlation between the control variable and 
the independent variables. On the other hand, there is a significant correlation between the variables 
number of owners and owner concentration (-0,675), but I choose to ignore this since the 
information of both of the variables derives from the observations of ownership structure. 
There is also a correlation between operating result and owner concentration (0,277). This number 
is on the other hand not very high, and we can therefore say that the variables are not strongly 
correlated. 
64
 4.4.3 Chi2 test
There are more than 65 hydroelectric energy companies in Norway. Actually there are several 
hundred producers of electricity from back water, rivers and waterfalls. Before I can make a 
generalized conclusion of the results to cover all of the companies, not only the 65 with the largest 
revenues, the criterion of equal variance or homoscedasticity has to be fulfilled. Homoscedasticity 
means that the variations around the regression line are relatively equal for all values of the 
independent variable (Wenstøp, 2003). This is an important criterion to fulfil in order to generalize 
the findings. In the following part a Chi2 test has been conducted. I have excluded the operating 
result and owner concentration since I can not test percentages in a test like the chi2.  
H0: constant variance
H1: changing variance of the variables
Test Statistics
Fixed pay Number of owners
Chi-square 56.216a2 51.541b
df 65 14
Asymp. Sig. (p) .773 .000
a. 66 cells (100,0%) have expected 
frequencies less than 5. The minimum 
expected cell frequency is 1,1.
b. 15 cells (100,0%) have expected 
frequencies less than 5. The minimum 
expected cell frequency is 4,9.
Figure 4.13: Chi2 test
The chi2 test is always testing the null hypothesis, which states that there is no significant difference 
between the expected and observed result. It tells us in what degree we can generalize the findings 
of the research. As we can see here, the chi2 values tells us that we can not accept the findings since 
66 cells have expected frequencies less than 5, even though p > 0,05 for fixed pay, meaning that we 
could accept the hypothesis. 
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 5 Discussion
After the empirical presentation in chapter four, I will try to provide an answer to the hypotheses as 
mentioned in chapter three. The interpretation of the empirical data will be presented with the 
theoretical basis of Agency theory from chapter two. I will finish off by concluding my findings, 
present a critique of my work, in addition to write briefly about my thoughts for further research. 
 5.1 Managerial compensation 
In chapter 2.1 and 2.2 I elaborated on managerial compensation, on incentive systems consisting of 
both one part fixed pay and one part performance-based pay. One of the cornerstones in Agency 
theory and the principal-agent relationship is that the compensation system or level of the agent is 
highly related to the agent's level of efforts, as indicated by Jensen (1998), Milgrom and Roberts 
(1992), Omholdt and Nesse (2001), and so on.  And there has been done a tremendous amount of 
research on the relationship between managerial pay and firm performance Lazear (1996), Fernie 
and Metcalf (1996), Kahn and Sharer (1990), Barkema and Gomez-Mejia (1998), Randøy and 
Skalpe (2007) and many, many more. As previously mentioned, the amount of time available for 
carrying through this paper did not allow collecting data about any potential performance-based 
managerial compensation. Instead, I had to base my analysis on the fixed pay to the CEO of each 
company, which information was significantly more accessible. Nevertheless, since most of the 
companies had such a contract with their CEO, I considered it possible to examine the relationship 
with the sufficient degree of reliability. 
Based on the extensive amount of theory about the principal-agent relationship, I still expect to see 
that there is a positive coherence between the managerial fixed pay and the operating result of the 
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energy companies. The development of managerial compensation in Norway between 1998 and 
2004 was according to Randøy and Skalpe (2007) increased by three times as much as the general 
increase. They say that it is so because of the introduction of stock options after 1998. They 
continue to say that the economical value of assigned stocks/stock options amounted to 34 % of the 
managerial salaries in publicly listed companies in 2005 (Randøy & Skalpe, 2007, p. 7). The 
growth has allegedly declined after 2003. If this data is representative for the energy sector as well, 
it means that the stock options constitutes a significant part of the management's compensation, and 
should therefore take it into consideration when evaluating the result of the analysis of the 
relationship between fixed pay and operating result. 
On the other hand, Randøy and Skalpe (2007) have concluded with something that will increase the 
reliability of the analysis. Accordingly, the existence of large and active owners, which is the case 
with the majority of the Norwegian hydroelectric energy companies, reduce the need for high 
managerial salaries. 
The following overview in Norwegian is received from the article Lederlønnsutvikling i Norge 
1996-2005 by Trond Randøy and Ole Skalpe (2007), published on www.regjeringen.no: 
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Figure 5.1: Explanatory factors to the level and growth of managerial pay
The factors which leads to lower managerial compensation are whether the company has a female 
CEO, female chairman of the board, or the seniority of the chairman of the board, whether it 
consists of one large and dominant owner, is situated in a rural district, and is owned by the public. 
Based on the presentation of the Norwegian hydroelectric energy companies in chapter 1.6, we see 
that the absolute majority of  the companies are characterized by half of the factors which leads to 
lower wages, in addition to that we can assume that the use of stock options have had a lower 
growth than many other sectors.  . 
With all of the information as mentioned above taken into consideration, I regard the reliability of 
the data to be sufficient enough as long as the different kinds of compensations (fixed pay and 
performance-based pay) are being held wide apart. After all, I do not have the sufficient information 
68
to make any further statements about performance-based pay in these companies. 
Based on the information above I expect that my first hypothesis is correct for my population: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): There is a positive relationship between the amount of fixed pay to the 
CEO and the profitability of the company.
The regression analysis gives the following result for the variables:
Model 1: β = .093 t = .741  Sig = .461
Model 2: β = .098 t = .771  Sig = .444
Figure 5.2: Regression analysis for models 1 and 2. 
For repetition, in model 1 I examined the relationship between the operating results and the fixed 
pay. In model 2 I included total revenues, the size of the largest owner and the number of owners as 
control variables. Based on the values listed the table above, it can seem like the level of fixed pay 
does not have any significant effect on the dependent variable measured by operating results at a 5 
% significance level. 
This is not in accordance with the vast amount of research made about incentive pay, but again, 
there is a change the outcome would have been different if I would have used performance-based 
pay instead of fixed pay. Another underlying reason could be the history of the Norwegian energy 
industry as elaborated in 1.6, where which describes the industry as being homogeneous and deep-
rooted in the old-fashion, pre-1991 market conditions where the only purpose of the power plants 
was to support their home regions at a reasonable price level. 
According to Randøy and Skalpe (2007), managerial compensation has increased by 89 % from 
1999 to 2005, primarily by the introduction of stock option, and at the same time as historical charts 
show that the profitability of the energy companies has increased as well (Proff). This is in 
accordance with relevant Agency theory, but the increase does not seem to be because of the level 
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of fixed salaries to the CEO. Additionally, Oxelhaim and Randøy (2005) state that as a consequence 
of globalization, the salaries have increased as well, which one would assume is the case of the 
energy companies because of the deregulation in 1991 where the market went from being a 
relatively closely and regulated market, to an open market with more 'capitalistic' objectives. 
More interesting, we have from before that the certainty equivalent of the CEO (employee) is 
[α + βe -C(e) – 1/2rβ2Var(x-γy)], the certainty equivalent of the board (employer) is 
[P(e)- (α – βe)], and thus the total certainty equivalent as presented in chapter 2.2.1 is 
[P(e) – C(e) – 1/2rβ2Var(x-γy)]. Consequently, the incentive constraint is [β – C'(e) = 0]  (Milgrom 
& Roberts 1992). As mentioned before, we see that the fixed pay which is the independent variable 
of this part is not even included in the total certainty equivalent. The equation therefore states that 
the employee is not basing his effort level on fixed pay at all. In contradiction to most agency 
theories, this is actually in accordance with the findings of this paper. Moreover, it follows that the 
mathematical example would support a positive relationship between performance-based pay and 
profitability. At the same time, Randøy and Skalpe (2007) state that the 89 % increase in managerial 
pay between 1999 and 2005 is because of the increasing use of stock options, and not any 
significant increase in the fixed pay. Put together with the increase in profitability of the 
hydroelectric energy companies, neither this supports the hypothesis. 
This is also in accordance with Eisenhardt, M, K. (1989), in which proposition number one said that 
when the contract between the principal and agent is outcome based, the agent is more likely to 
behave in the interests of the principal. Thus, I have no basis for saying that the level of the fixed 
pay will affect the profitability. 
The next and final argumentation on why my findings goes against most research on the area of the 
principal-agent relationship, is that there are other external factors which have significantly more 
effect on profitability than managerial pay. These external factors encompass the rate of flow, or 
flow of water of the river or waterfall which is controlled by each company. In addition to the size 
of the river, the annual level of precipitation is also affecting the results. This also goes for the 
relationship between ownership structure and profitability, thus it will be thoroughly elaborated in 
chapter 5.5. 
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Conclusively, I refer to chapter 5.5 (critique) on an elaboration on the external factors in which I 
believe have a considerable effect on the relationship of the hypothesis H1. 
 5.2 Ownership concentration
In chapter 2.1, 2.3 and 2.4 the focus was on ownership concentration where the mainstream 
research supports a positive effect by having a few and large owners. The hypotheses regarding 
ownership concentration were: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): There is a positive relationship between ownership concentration and the 
operating result of the company. 
And:
Hypothesis 3 (H3): There is a negative relationship between the number of owners and the 
operating result of the company.
Hansmann (quoted in Thomsen, 2008 pp. 99-95) says that the ownership concentration is deciding 
the shareholders' power to influence the strategies and objectives of the companies, in addition the 
way they exercise their power. He continues by arguing that ownership concentration effects the 
profit goals, dividends, capital structure and growth rates of the companies, in other words; 
profitability.  According to the research of Hansmann, we should see a positive relationship between 
the size of the largest owner and the operating result, and a negative relationship between the 
number of owners and the operating result. One of the reasons to this is what Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) called a trade off between risk and incentive efficiency. They say that large owners will have 
stronger incentives to monitor managers and ensure that their interests are being maintained. 
Accordingly, this would explain any positive relationship between high profitability and the energy 
companies which have only one owner, or a few minorities with one dominating owner. 
71
Fama and Jensen (1983) on the other hand said that if the share becomes too large, the expropriation 
of the minor shareholders kicks in, and the profitability declines, as seen in figure 2.3. Based on 
this, it should be hypothetically possible to figure out the optimal share with regards to maximum 
operating results. Anyhow, if the research of Fama and Jensen can be generalized on to the 
Norwegian energy sector, we should already be able to reject H3 and H3.
On the other hand, I also elaborated on the role of the government as a major owner in all but one of 
the largest energy companies in my population, both directly and indirectly. Based on the presented 
theory by Thomsen (2008) we could assume a non-existing or weak relationship between the 
independent variables and the dependent variable, despite the consensual research on this field. 
There are arguments saying that governmental ownership will emphasize stakeholder interests and 
political goals in a larger degree. Examples of political goals relevant for the energy industry are 
low output prices or employment. So to say, an in accordance with the pre-1991 market conditions 
as mentioned above, governmental ownership is an institutional alternative to regulations 
(Thomsen, 2008). 
If we regard the theories about governmental majority ownership (Thomsen, 2008), the stakeholder 
value perspectives by Freeman and Reed (1982) and De Wit and Meyer (2004), and the article by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) defining property rights together, we can say that the purpose of the 
Norwegian hydroelectric energy companies is to emphasize the social regional communities in a 
much larger degree than other companies. According to Randøy and Skalpe (2007) and Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), this would also explain and support a weaker relationship between ownership 
concentration and profitability. That means that it could explain any relationship between the 
variables in H2 and H3. 
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So what does the findings of this paper tell us? The regression analysis in chapter 4.4.2 gives us the 
following numbers: 
β t Sig.
Model 1: -.038 -.299 .766
Model 2: .298 -455787 .010
Model 3: .433 .2.584 .012
Figure 5.3: Regression analysis for model 1-3. 
To sum up, the models included:
Model 1: Operating result, number of owners
Model 2: Operating result, owner concentration
Model 3: Operating result, Managerial pay, Number of owners, Owner concentration, Total 
revenues of the company
As we can see from these numbers, there seem to be a weak negatively relationship between the 
number of owners and the operating results of the companies. This is as expected and in accordance 
with relevant theories. However, the numbers are not good enough to conclude a relationship. 
Therefore, it seems like I  would have to reject hypothesis 3; I do not have a good enough basis for 
saying there is is a negatively relationship between the number of owners and the operating results 
in Norwegian hydroelectric energy companies. 
 5.3 Summary of the results
In order to reject or support the hypotheses, some decision criteria have to be defined. First of all, 
there are two kinds of tests which can be used. In this paper, I have used a two-tailed test in order to 
determine any relationship between the dependent variable and the independent. The alternative 
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would be to use a one-tailed test, which is used to point out the direction of the between the 
variables, meaning whether the variables are positively or negatively related. SPSS has in this case 
provided a two-tailed test. If the Sig.-values provided by SPSS fall under the 5 %-significance level 
(0,05), we should reject the hypothesis.  Thus, I will base the results on the t and Sig.-values. 
 5.3.1 Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1 (H1): There is a positive relationship between the amount of fixed pay to the 
CEO and the profitability of the company.
SPSS tells us that the beta coefficient is 0,093, meaning that if the profitability will increase by 
0,093 if the fixed pay is increased by 1. This indicates a positive relationship between the variables. 
On the other hand, we can not say that the the variable Fixed pay is significant based on the t-value 
of 0,771 and significance level of 0,461. We therefore reject hypothesis 1. 
 5.3.2 Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2 (H2): There is a positive relationship between ownership concentration and the 
operating result of the company. 
When it comes to the size of the largest owner, we see that the beta coefficient is 0,298. But based 
on the t-value of 2.652 and the level of significance at 0,010 we can say there is a weak positive 
relationship between the size of the largest shareholder and the operating results of the companies. 
Thus; hypothesis 2 is supported.
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 5.3.3 Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 3 (H3): There is a negative relationship between the number of owners and the 
operating result of the company.
In this case, we see that the beta coefficient is -0,038, which tells us that if the number of owners 
increase by 1, the profitability will decrease by 0,038. The t-value of -0,299 shows a very weak 
negatively relationship between the number of owners and the operating result. This is in 
accordance with the relevant theories, which as previously mentioned indicated that a higher 
number of owners goes on the expense of profitability of the company. However, the numbers are 
not good enough to point out a significant relationship. Based on this, we reject hypothesis 3. 
 5.4 General interpretations
 5.4.1 Managerial compensation
From before, we know that there has been an average increase in managerial salaries between 1999 
and 2005 (Randøy & Skalpe, 2007) which can assumed to be partly valid for the energy companies 
as well, and we also know that there has been a significant increase in profitability in the energy 
sector (Proff). Thus, there seems to be a positive relationship between the increase in managerial 
pay and profitability of the largest Norwegian hydroelectric energy companies. 
What we can say based on the test results in this paper, is that the profitability seems to be 
insignificantly affected by the level of fixed pay. Instead, other methods of compensation, such as 
stock options in particular, seems to be the value adding factor in this context. In fact, Randøy & 
Skalpe (2007) determined the economical value of stock options in 2005 to be 34 % of CEO pay.
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 5.4.2 Size of the largest owner
The description by Edling et al. (2007) (presented in Thomsen, 2008) of owner concentration and 
common owner identities in some of the northern-European countries has proven to be correct with 
regards to Norway and the energy sector. First, to recall the bell-shaped graph in figure 2.3:
Figure 5.4:  Relationship between share of ownership and firm performance (Thomsen, 2008)
As mentioned in chapter 2, the dotted line indicates the optimal share. If the interpretation by 
Thomsen (2008) based on the research of Demsetz and Lahn (1985) and Zeckhauser and Pound 
(1990) is transfarable to the Norwegian energy sector, we would not be able to see a linear positive 
relationship between the size of the share and the oparating result. Instead, the companies with one 
very large owner a few minorities as for instance Røldal-Suldal Kraft AS (see appendix), would not 
have the same basis for achieving good operating results. At the same time Thomsen emphasizes 
that the governmental type of ownership could give a graph which looks different from this. 
In the regression analysis in chapter 4.4.2 and 5.3.2 we could see that there seemed to a weak 
positive relationship between the size of the largest shareholder and the profitability as indicated by 
the operating results. In this context, it means that the companies consisting of a large number of 
municipalities as for instance Trønder Energi AS which is owned by 23 nearby municipalities where 
none of them own more than 10 % of the company. In this case, the operating result is “as low as” 
38 %, in other words; what we would expect it to be according to the theories mentioned above. 
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Share of ownership 
      Performance
At the same time, hypothesis 2 and the determined, though weak, relationship between these 
variables is in accordance with Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama and Jensen (1983) which 
state that a larger owner will have better incentives to monitor the management and ensure the level 
of efforts in order to achieve the highest profitable results. A large and dominant owner will also 
have better decision power in order to influence the managers, which means that a large owner 
could communicate its wishes and guidelines to the manager, than a small and insignificant owner 
would be able to. 
Even though we can assume that the stakeholder value perspective as mentioned by Freeman and 
Reed (1983) and De Wit and Meyer (2004) is moderating the relationship between the variables, 
since focusing on the environment, employment or consumer friendly output prices goes on the 
expense of profitability, it seems like even the government and the local authorities do emphasize 
the shareholder value when in a strong position to influence the management. 
 5.4.3 Number of owners
According to chapter 5.3.3, I was not able to determine a positive relationship between the number 
of owners and the operating results. This is despite of research of for instance Randøy and Skalpe 
(2007), Hansmann (as quoted in Thomsen, 2008 pp. 99-95) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) which 
by the way has to be regarded in the same context as the size of the largest owner. 
One of the reasons to why not any link has been determined, could be the tremendous governmental 
and municipal influence on these companies. First of all, as mentioned above, in the majority of the 
companies which have a larger number of owners, the owners are mostly different municipalities 
with the same share. We can assume that these are shareholders with homogeneous preferences and 
can therefore be considered as one large owner. This implicates the matter of which this analysis 
has been conducted, and can thus give an incorrectly result. 
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Secondly, as it has been said by De Wit and Meyer (2004) and Freeman and Reed (1982) the 
government will tend to emphasize stakeholder values. There is even a juridical basis  for including 
stakeholder values in the decision making processes (NVE) and focus more on political goals such 
as output prices and employment Eisenhardt, M, K. (1989), and a green environment. 
Finally, it must be said that the number of owners and the size of the largest shareholder are related 
in the sense that if the largest shareholder has 10 % of the company, it is a given that there must be 
at least 10 shareholders which in this case is above the average and can be defined as “many”. Thus, 
a part of the interpretation of the ownership concentration in chapter 5.4.2 is can be said about the 
number of owners as well. 
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 5.5 Conclusion
Since this study focused on the 72 largest companies with regard to total revenues, any findings 
would be of significance. Still, we should be careful if we are to transfer the findings to smaller 
companies since the outcomes of Szroeter's test of homoscedasticity were not good enough. 
The purpose of this study was to examine the relationship between the level of fixed pay and the 
profitability of a significant number of the largest producers of hydroelectric electricity in Norway, 
and to find out whether the ownership structure, meaning the number of owners and the size of the 
largest shareholder, would affect the profitability as well. The profitability in this case is indicated 
by the operating result variable. The reason why I did not choose the annual results as a variable is 
that the unusually high average operating results in the hydroelectric energy sector justifies 
extensive investments in developing power plants and lines. Hence, the annual results do not reflect 
the efficiency, level of competency and the “real” profitability of the companies. Based on this, the 
formal problem definition was as follows: 
Is there coherence between managerial pay, ownership structure, ownership concentration 
and profitability of Norwegian hydroelectric energy companies? 
In the light of the analyses in chapter 4, I was able to answer the problem definition using a selected 
few variables. I was not able to determine a significant positive relationship between the level of 
fixed pay, the number of owners, and profitability. However, based on the regression analysis of the 
relationship between ownership concentration and operating results in chapter 4.4.2 there seems to 
be a weak positive relationship between the size of the largest shareholder and the profitability of 
the companies. 
First of all, managerial compensation, here indicated by the level of fixed pay to the CEO, has been 
subject to a vast amounts of studies. One of the cornerstones in Agency theory is the problem of 
motivating the agent to attain a higher level of effort and converging the goals of the principal and 
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the agent (Clarke, 2008). Managerial pay normally consists of one part fixed pay, and one part 
performance-based pay, and it is the performance-based part that best explains the relationship 
between managerial pay and profitability. Unfortunately, since the limited time period for this thesis 
did not allow collecting empirical data about stock options or other performance-based 
compensation methods of 72 companies, I had to use the more easily accessible information about 
the fixed pay. 
Secondly, the ownership concentration is according to Thomsen (2008) measured by the size of the 
largest shareholder. As mentioned above, the profitability of companies where there is one large and 
dominant owner seemed to be slightly higher than the companies equally owned in cooperation by 
for instance a larger number of municipalities, which is a common ownership structure in the 
Norwegian energy industry. This is in accordance with the relevant theory on this field, for instance 
as presented by Clarce (2008), Keasey, Thompson, and Wright (2005), and Thomsen (2008). This 
relationship seems to be existing despite the fact that in the pre-1991 market conditions the 
hydroelectric energy companies existed for one reason only; to support the local communities or 
what Freedman and Reed (1983) would call emphasizing stakeholder values in a wide sense. This 
purpose of organizational existence seems to still be existing until this day, both culturally and 
juridically, in addition to the fact that even though the domestic energy market was opened up and 
deregulated by the conservative Syse-government in 1991, there is still a considerably strong 
governmental or municipal dominance in all but a few of the energy companies, both directly and 
indirectly. According to Freedman and Reed (1983) this would moderate the effect between the 
assumed positive relationship between ownership concentration and profitability. We can only 
speculate in whether the relationship between the variables would be much more significant if the 
companies were privately owned and were operating without “stakeholder constraints”. 
And finally, I expected to find a similar, but negatively, relationship between the number of owners 
and the profitability of the companies. However, I was not able to determine such a correspondence. 
As elaborated above, the number of owners is closely related to the size of the largest shareholder. 
The relevant theories about the effect of an increasing number of owners say that owners with an 
relatively insignificant number of shares do not have the incentives to monitor the management of 
the companies, thus creating a lower level of efforts among managers which in the next step leads to 
decreased profitability (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
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 5.6 Critique
There are several things that could effect the results of this study. For starters,  the methodical 
framework presumes sufficient validity and reliability in order to draw conclusions. The first focus 
of the study was managerial compensation. I chose fixed pay to indicate the managerial pay, and it 
was considered to be sufficient in chapter 3.9.1. A better alternative would be to use the fixed pay in 
combination with other methods of compensations which are based on the performance of the 
CEO's. There is a chance that the fixed pay does not give a complete and sufficiently nuanced 
image of the relationship between the managerial compensation and the operating result. 
Unfortunately, to come up with information about other arrangements, for instance bonuses, stock 
options, stock grants, and other benefits (i.e. health insurances, fringe benefits, pension schemes, 
etc.) for even a small portion of the companies in this this research turned out to be too difficult and 
time-consuming for the limited time available for this paper. Of perhaps even higher importance is 
that if we assume a relatively equal or standardized CEO total salary in the industry, and that the 
distribution of fixed pay and performance-based pay is unequal from company to company, we can 
imagine that if part consisting of the the fixed pay is low, it might indicate that the performance-
based part is correspondingly hight. If this is the case, if would mean implications for the reliability 
of the paper since this study takes for granted that low fixed pay indicates a low total pay. 
Secondly, early in the research process I discovered that there could be external factors which could 
have significantly stronger influence on the financial results of the companies than the variables I 
had selected for this thesis. By this I mean the rate of flow (flow of water) through the turbines of 
each power plant. For instance, there can be relatively small companies which have the property 
rights of large rivers, waterfalls, or back waters with a very high rate of flow. At the same time, 
some of the companies may produce their electricity from smaller rivers and waterfalls, or dammed 
up lakes with unoptimized  water pressure, but still be large enough to be on the list of this research. 
An hypothetical example may be two different hydroelectric energy companies. The first company 
has the property rights of a huge river, but is situated in a small place where the use of complexed 
incentive systems are not as common, despite the aftermath of globalization influence as indicated 
by Randøy and Oxelholm (2008). The CEO of this company receives a relatively low fixed salary 
as he has done for many years. The other company has through many years hired top students and 
managers from reputable schools and firms, which leads to higher managerial compensation than 
the first company. This happens despite the fact that the river is smaller and highly dependent on the 
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seasonal precipitation. In this case, the first company will still be able to achieve a better operating 
result than the second company. When it comes to this research, it can lead to inaccurate results. 
Another external factor which is similar to the one above, is how stable the precipitation is over the 
years and in different parts of the country. For instance, my population is not limited to any specific 
parts of the country. To illustrate the difference I will present the following diagrams in Norwegian 
(NVE).
• Område 1 (Area 1): This 
diagram illustrates the filling 
of water dams in the eastern 
parts of Norway and the 
Agder-regions. 
• Område 2 (Area 2): This 
diagram illustrates the areas 
of the west cost counties, 
including Rogaland, 
Hordaland and Sogn og 
Fjordane. 
•   Område 3 (Area 3): Covers 
the northernmost areas of 
Finnmark, Troms, Nordland, 
Nord-Trøndelag, Sør-
Trøndelag in addition to Møre 
& Romsdal. 
Figures 5.5: Filling of water 
dams
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As we can see from these diagrams, there are differences that will in the first step affect the 
production of electricity, then the pricing of electricity, and in the last step the operating result and 
the profit margins of the companies. In addition to the regional differences, we can see even more 
clearly that there are differences from one year to the other. The variance between the minimum and 
maximum value between 1990 and 2007 for area 1 is almost as much as 100 %. Unquestionably, 
this must have an financial impact on the companies. 
So with regards to this, how can the research be improved in order to achieve a more nuanced 
image of the industry? An alternative would be to conduct analyses for each of the regions 1 2 or 3, 
or most important; to include rate of flow as a variable. Unfortunately, this could have been possible 
in the beginning of the working period, but has instead become an idea for further research. 
When it comes to the managerial pay of the companies, it has been mentioned that the companies 
have had a high growth in salaries as a result of globalization among other factors. According to 
Randøy and Skalpe (2007), there has been a significant growth (89 %) in CEO compensation 
between 1999 and 2005. This has happened because the managerial incentive system has changed 
from consisting of a large part of fixed pay to a larger part of stock options. Unfortunately and as 
mentioned above, it was not possible to include stock options as a variable in this paper because of 
the restricted accessibility of the information and the limited amount of time available. 
Other factors which has an impact on the compensation is the age of the CEO. According to 
Oxelheim and Randøy (2008), the age of the CEO plays a role in when determining the level of 
compensation. Accordingly, as the age of the CEO increases the level of compensation increases 
simultaneously because of seniority. The age of the top executive in the companies could have been 
included for adjusting the relationship between managerial compensation and operating result. In 
the same research, Oxelheim and Randøy also mentions diversity of Anglo-American board 
members as contribution for higher compensation. On the other hand, if the CEO has share of the 
company, or if the length of service of the chairman of the board is long-lasting, the level of 
compensation will decrease. The date of birth of not only the CEO, but the board members as well, 
is actually accessible together with the rest of the company information and accounting data. 
Unfortunately, it was excluded from this analysis because of the limited amount of time. 
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 5.7 Thoughts for further research
Primarily, and as mentioned above, it would be interesting to conduct the same research and include 
the rate of flow (flow of water) for each hydroelectric power plant as a variable. As previously 
discussed, it can seem like the rate of flow could have a greater effect on the financial numbers than 
the variables related to the agency theory. 
Another though of interest would be to include a few of the variables used in Oxelheim and Randøy 
(2008) such as:
• Regional location 
• The age of the CEO
• Whether the company has a female CEO
• Whether the company has a female chairman of the board
• The seniority of the board members
According to empirical research and discussions on this field, these factors could be considered 
when examining the principal-agent relationship in Norwegian hydroelectric energy companies. 
While working on this paper, I also longed for an international comparison to the organizational 
structures and conditions in other relevant countries. Undoubtedly, the production of hydroelectric 
power is significantly higher in Norway than other countries which are not blessed with 
mountainous topology, but the principal-agent relationship as a subject for analysis remains 
comparable across state boarders. 
And finally, as mentioned by Randøy and Skalpe (2007), managerial compensation has increased by 
89 % between 1999 and 2005, at the same time as historical charts show that the profitability of the 
energy companies has increased as well (Proff). Without proving a direct relation, this seems to be 
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in accordance with relevant Agency theory. However, the increase in managerial compensation does 
not seem to be caused by level of fixed salaries to the CEO. Instead, Randøy and Skalpe (2007) say 
that the increase is primarily caused by the introduction of performance-based incentive systems as 
stock options. The next step could be to do the same analysis, but focus on the relationship between 
performance-based pay and profitability of the companies. 
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Appendix
Companies (more than NOK 100 
millions in total revenues)
Total 
revenues
Operating 
result (%)
Managerial 
compensation
Statkraft SF 25465000000 68.8 3.013.000
Statkraft AS 12154000000 56.5 2.300.000
Hydro Norsk Energie 20635882000 5,00 0
Lyse Energi AS 4394601000 55.6 1.537.000
BKK AS 4121272000 57.8 1.976.000
Agder Energi Produksjon AS 3503109000 52.3 1.116.000
Skagerak Energi AS 3384010000 64.2 1.350.000
E-CO Vannkraft AS 2902905000 74.9 1.629.000
Lyse Produksjon AS 2492563000 71.9 1.079.000
BKK Produksjon AS 2345177000 71.3 1.113.000
Nte Energi AS 2024491000 34.7 935.000
Skagerak Kraft AS 1932509000 74.2 1.099.000
Eidsiva Vannkraft AS 1408200000 68.6 1.155.000
Istad AS 1310000000 10.0 1.098.000
Helgelandskraft AS 1279895000 27.0 1.015.000
Trondheims Energi AS 1145405000 72.4 953.000
Tafjord Kraft AS 115880000 48 4.919.000
Trønder Energi AS 1023320000 38 1.411.000
SKL Produksjon AS 964855000 58.9 1.119.000
Sunnhordaland Kraftlag AS 964855000 58.9 0
Hafslund Produksjon AS 896714000 76.2 1.150.000
Oppland Energi AS 835252000 72.3 600000
Haugaland Kraft AS 776202000 16.0 1.340.000
Sogn og Fjordane Energi AS 434010000 24.0 1.111.000
EB Kraftproduksjon AS 691910000 63.7 963.000
Østfold Energi AS 718623000 71.1 1.393.000
Trønderenergi Kraft AS 712596000 60.2 829.000
Tafjord Kraftproduksjon AS 689839000 73.1 978.000
Tussa Kraft AS 662000000 27.0 781000
SKS Produksjon AS 654722000 58.0 1.029.000
SFE Produksjon AS 543541000 26.0 879.000
Aktieselsk. Tyssefaldene AS 616200000 2.0 1.060.000
Gudbrandsdal Energi AS 501110000 8.0 866.000
Kraftverkene i Orkla AS 498196000 70.9 150000
Ringerikskraft AS 142520000 21.0 984.000
Aktieselskabet i Saudefaldene 428607000 42.8 551.000
Nordkraft Produksjon AS 415303000 57.2 1.535.000
Troms Kraft Produksjon AS 407661000 49 880.000
86
Istad Kraft AS 402022000 13.0 845.000
Røldal-Suldal Kraft AS 399709000 75.7 0
Bodø Energi AS 378720000 18.0 1.039.000
Tussa Energi AS 366598000 44.7 0
Elkem Energi Siso AS 350167000 74.7 1.009.000
Oslo Lysverker AS 340248000 76.9 0
Sunnfjord Energi AS 323760000 23.0 945.000
Glomma Kraftprod. AS 311779000 81.2 0
Vardar AS 232500000 -0.6 1.496.000
Sira Kvina Kraftselskap AS 305961000 18.0 1.284.000
Lågen og Øvre Glomma 
Kraftproduksjon AS
284185000 76.8 0
Uste Nes AS 252000000 48.6 0
AS Eidefoss 247000000 54.6 818000
Dalane Energi IKS 245714000 21 777000
Elkem Energi Bremanger AS 230755000 64.8 1030000
Sognekraft AS 209836000 40.2 1059000
Eastern Norge Svartisen AS 183861000 62.4 245000
Arendals Fossekompagni AS 173584000 71.1 1500000
Pasvik Kraft AS 164810000 69.6 512000
Tinfos AS 160416000 42.8 7685000
Otra Kraft DA 150586000 -14.9 874000
Ringerikskraft-Produksjon AS 148859000 59.2 295000
Skagerak Energi AS 138401000 -56 1359000
Sykkylven Energi AS 137649000 13.0 636000
Midt-Telemark Energi AS 134811000 11.0 814000
Opplandskraft DA 127225000 -39.2 250000
Meløy Energi AS 123515000 6.0 853000
Voss Energi AS 120479000 33.6 914000
Røros Elektrisitetsverk AS 117119000 15.0 774000
Rauma Energi AS 116029000 44.8 352000
Øvre Hallingdal Kraftproduksjon AS 115181000 80.7 0
Gaudal Energi AS 112457000 5 896000
Alta Kraftlag AS 108683000 -8.6 760000
Trollfjord Kraft AS 105332000 9 867000
Stranda Energiverk AS 103651000 11.0 802000
Kvænangen Kraftverk AS 100082000 67.1 50000
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Companies (more than NOK 100 millions 
in total revenues)
Number of 
owners
Share of largest 
owner (%)
Statkraft SF 1 100
Statkraft AS 1 100
Hydro Norsk Energie 1 100
Lyse Energi AS 17 67
BKK AS 18 49
Agder Energi Produksjon AS 1 100
Skagerak Energi AS 4 67
E-CO Vannkraft AS 1 100
Lyse Produksjon AS 1 100
BKK Produksjon AS 1 100
Nte Energi AS 1 100
Skagerak Kraft AS 1 100
Eidsiva Vannkraft AS 1 100
Istad AS 3 50
Helgelandskraft AS 14 20
Trondheims Energi AS 1 100
Tafjord Kraft AS 4 50
Trønder Energi AS 23 10
SKL Produksjon AS 1 100
Sunnhordaland Kraftlag AS 8 40
Hafslund Produksjon AS 1 100
Oppland Energi AS 1 100
Haugaland Kraft AS 7 10
Sogn og Fjordane Energi AS 10 48
EB Kraftproduksjon AS 2 60
Østfold Energi AS 14 50
Trønderenergi Kraft AS 1 100
Tafjord Kraftproduksjon AS 1 100
Tussa Kraft AS 9 10
SKS Produksjon AS 2 79
SFE Produksjon AS 1 100
Aktieselsk. Tyssefaldene AS 3 40
Gudbrandsdal Energi AS 4 25
Kraftverkene i Orkla AS 4 33
Ringerikskraft AS 2 88
Aktieselskabet i Saudefaldene 2 85
Nordkraft Produksjon AS 3 50
Troms Kraft Produksjon AS 1 100
Istad Kraft AS 1 100
Røldal-Suldal Kraft AS 2 91
Bodø Energi AS 1 100
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Tussa Energi AS 1 100
Elkem Energi Siso AS 1 100
Oslo Lysverker AS 1 100
Sunnfjord Energi AS 8 37
Glomma Kraftprod. AS 1 100
Vardar AS 21 20
Sira Kvina Kraftselskap AS 4 41
Lågen og Øvre Glomma Kraftproduksjon AS 1 100
Uste Nes AS 1 100
AS Eidefoss 5 20
Dalane Energi IKS 4 60
Elkem Energi Bremanger AS 1 100
Sognekraft AS 7 45
Eastern Norge Svartisen AS 1 100
Arendals Fossekompagni AS 20 10
Pasvik Kraft AS 1 100
Tinfos AS 5 23
Otra Kraft DA 2 68
Ringerikskraft-Produksjon AS 1 100
Skagerak Energi AS 3 66
Sykkylven Energi AS 1 100
Midt-Telemark Energi AS 3 33
Opplandskraft DA 4 25
Meløy Energi AS 1 100
Voss Energi AS 1 100
Røros Elektrisitetsverk AS 3 66
Rauma Energi AS 1 100
Øvre Hallingdal Kraftproduksjon AS 1 100
Gaudal Energi AS 2 50
Alta Kraftlag AS 1 100
Trollfjord Kraft AS 1 100
Stranda Energiverk AS 1 100
Kvænangen Kraftverk AS 5 20
89
References
Books and articles
Barkema, H. & Gomez-Mejia, L.R. (1998), Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 41, No. 2, 
Special research forum on managerial compensation and firm performance (Apr., 1998),  pp. 135-
145.
Clarke, T. (2008). Theories of Corporate Governance: The theoretical foundations. Routledge. 
De Wit, B. & Meyer, R. (2004), Strategy – Process, Content and Context. Thompson. 
Edling et al., (2007). Corporate governance in Scandinavia: Comparing Networks and Formal 
Institutions. European Management Review, Volume 5, Number 1, 2008, pp. 27-40 (14). 
Fama & Jensen (1983), Seperation of Ownership and Control. Journal of Law and Economics, Vol 
XXVI, June 1983, and Foundations of Organizational Strategy, Michael C. Jensen, Harvard 
University Press, 1998. 
Fernie S. & Metcalf D. (1996), It's not what you pay, it's the way you pay it. Jockey's pay and 
performance, CEIS, Fondazione Giacomo Brodolini and Blackwell Publishing Ltd, vol. 13(2), pp. 
385-411, 06. 
Freeman E. & Reed D. (1983). Stockholders and stakeholders: A new perspective on corporate 
governance in De Wit, B. and Meyer, R. (2004) Strategy: Process, Content and Context (pp. 616 
-621). Thomsen. 
Gripsrud, G. & Olsson, U.H. (2000). Markedsanalyse. 2nd edition. Høyskoleforlaget. 
90
Hansmann, H. (1988). Ownership of the firm. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 4(2),  
pp. 267-305. 
Hair, J.F., Money, A.H., Samouel, P. and Page, M. (2007), Research Methods for Business. Wiley, 
Chichester. 
Jensen, (1998a). Foundations of organizational strategy. Harvard University Press. 
Keasey, K., Thompson, S.R. and Wright, M. (2005), Corporate governance: Accountability,  
Enterprise and International Comparison. John Wiley and Sons. 
Lazear, E. P. (1997), Incentives in Basic Research. Journal of Labour Ecenomics, University of 
Chicago Press, Vol. 15, No 1.
Lazear, E. P. (1997), Salaries and piece rates. Journal of Labour Business, University of Chicago 
Press, Vol. 59(3), pp. 405-431. 
Lund, T & Haugen, R. (2006). Forskningsprosessen. Unipub forlag. 
Milgrom, P. & Roberts, J, (1992). Economics, organization & management. Prentice Hall.
Olson, H. & Sørensen, S., (2003). Forsningsprosessen. Gyldendal Norsk Forlag. 
Omholdt, K. & Nesse, J.G. (2001). Mennesker, organisasjon og ledelse. Gyldendal akademiske. 
Oxelheim, L. & Randøy, T. (2005). The Anglo-American financial structure on CEO compensation 
in non-Anglo-American firms. Vol 36, issue 4: 470-483. Journal of International Business Studies.  
91
ISSN: 0047-2506
Oxelheim, L. & Randøy, T. (2008). Corporate Governance Guidelines Compliance and CEO pay, in 
Markets and Compensation for Executives in Europe. The Emerald Group Publishing Limited 
(2008). 
Randøy, T. & Skalpe, O. (2007). Hva forklarer lederlønn i norske selskaper? Praktisk økonomi og 
finans, Universitetsforlaget. ISSN: 1501-0074.
Thomas C, (2004). Theories of Corporate Governance. Routledge. 
Thompson, S, (2008). An introduction to Corporate governance. DJØF Publishing Copenhagen.
Wensøp, F. (2003). Statistikk og dataanalyse. Universitetsforlaget. 
Xavier V, (2000). Corporate Govern -  Theoretical & Empirical Perspectives. Cambridge 
University Press. 
Zikmund, W.G. (2003). Business Research Methods. South-Western, Division of Thomson 
Learning. 
Internet
Brønnøysundregisteret (2009), About us. Received 14th of November from 
http://www.brreg.no/english/about.html
Empirical data. Received between September and October (2009) from http://www.proff.no
92
Hva skjer med velferdsstaten? Om Liberaliseringer of dereguleringer på utvalgte områder i perioden 
1980-2005. (2005) DeFacto Kunnskapssenter for Fagorganiserte. 
Monopoler for fall. Europeiske liberaliseringsprosesser og forvaltningsreformer. Statskonsult 
(2001). GjøvikTrykkeri AS. ISNB: 82-7483-093-8. 
Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE) (2009). Received 15th of September 
from http://www.nve.no/no/kraftmarked/analyser/vassmagasinstatistikk.
Predergast, C. (1996). What happens within firms? A survey of empirical evidence on compensation 
policies. Working paper 5802. National Bureau of Economic Research. Received 3rd of November 
from http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/canice.prendergast/research/whathappenswithinfirms.pdf
Randøy & Skalpe (2007). Lederlønnsutvikling i Norge 1996-2005. Trond Randøy og Ole Skalpe. 
Prosjektrapport nr. 2/2007. ISSN: 0803-8198. Received from: 
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/AID/publikasjoner/rapporter_og_planer/2007/R2007_lederlonn.p
df
Sogn Avis (2009). Fekk gjennomslag for klage. Received 5th of October from 
http://www.sognavis.no/lokale_nyhende/article4605212.ece
Theories used in IS research: Agency theory (n.d.). Received 20th of October from 
http://www.isttheory.yorku.ca/agencytheory.com
Vurdering av nøkkeltall – Resultat av driften i %. Received between September and October (2009) 
from http://www.proff.no/proff/search/explanationPopup.c?key=RG
93
